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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The effects of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
diversification have been widely investigated in corporate strategy research. However, majority 
of the previous studies have presumed that all owners have identical decision making objectives 
and motivation. This paper contributes to the existing knowledge on the implications of different 
owner identities by pointing out a link between owner identity and unrelated corporate 
diversification decision. In addition, this paper further investigates the association between 
unrelated corporate diversification and investor protection and demonstrates that the effect of 
owner identity on corporate decision making is dependent on the institutional environment. 
DATA 
The company information used in the analysis is obtained from the Worldscope database. The 
sample consists of 2,956 publicly traded firms from 14 countries representing Common law, 
German civil law, French civil law and Scandinavian law countries. The analysis is effectively a 
cross-section of the year-end situation in 2010 and most of the data is from 2010 financial 
statements. The information on the identity and ownership share of the largest owner is manually 
collected from the Thomson ONE Banker database. 
RESULTS 
The results show that the owner identity is an important factor in corporate decision making, and 
that there are significant differences in how owner identities behave in respect to corporate 
diversification decisions. Of all owner identities, unrelated corporate diversification is least 
common among private equity owners. I also observe a negative relationship between 
institutionally owned firms and unrelated corporate diversification. Further, the results show that 
unrelated corporate diversification is most common in German and French civil law countries, 
characterized with weak shareholder protection, and least prevalent in Common law environment 
known for high level of investor protection. In line with this, investor protection measures ASD 
and ADR are negatively associated with the level of unrelated corporate diversification. In 
addition, the results indicate that the influence of owner identity on corporate diversification 
decisions is dependent on the institutional background and owner identity plays bigger role in an 
environment characterized with weak shareholder protection. 
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OMISTAJAIDENTITEETIN JA SIJOITTAJANSUOJAN VAIKUTUS YRITYKSEN 
YDINLIIKETOIMINNAN ULKOPUOLISEEN HAJAUTTAMISEEN 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Omistusrakenteen ja corporate governance -mekanismien vaikutusta yrityksen 
hajauttamispäätökseen on tutkittu laajasti strategiakirjallisuudessa. Suurimmalta osin 
aikaisemmat tutkimukset ovat kuitenkin olettaneet, että omistajien tavoitteet koskien 
päätöksentekoa ovat yhteneväiset. Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on osoittaa, että omistajien 
päätöksentekomotiivit ovat hyvin erilaiset, ja omistajaidentiteetillä on merkittävä vaikutus 
yrityksen ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolisen hajauttamisen määrään. Lisäksi tutkimus selvittää 
sijoittajansuojan ja ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolisen hajauttamisen välistä suhdetta, ja pyrkii 
todentamaan, että omistajaidentiteetin vaikutus hajauttamispäätökseen on riippuvainen 
liiketoimintaympäristöstä.    
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkimuksessa käytetty yrityskohtainen lähdeaineisto on kerätty Worldscope -tietokannasta. 
Tutkimuksen otos sisältää 2,956 yritystä 14 eri maasta, jotka edustavat neljää eri lakiperhettä. 
Analyysi on läpileikkaus vuodesta 2010 ja suurin osa tiedoista on vuoden 2010 tilinpäätöksistä. 
Yritysten omistustiedot on kerätty manuaalisesti Thomson ONE Banker tietokannasta.  
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että omistajaidentiteetillä on huomattava vaikutus yrityksen 
ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuoliseen hajauttamiseen. Etenkin pääomasijoittajien omistamat 
yritykset hajauttavat merkittävästi vähemmän ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolelle. 
Ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolinen hajauttaminen on myös selkeästi alhaisempaa 
institutionaalisten sijoittajien omistamissa yrityksissä. Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat, että 
ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolinen hajauttaminen on vähäisempää maissa, missä sijoittajansuoja 
on parempi. Edelleen tulokset indikoivat, että omistajaidentiteetin vaikutus yrityksen 
hajauttamispäätökseen on riippuvainen liiketoimintaympäristöstä, ja että omistajaidentiteetin 
vaikutus päätöksentekoon on suurempi maissa, missä sijoittajansuoja on alhainen.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Determinants of corporate diversification
1
 have been one of the most debated issues in corporate 
strategy research and it has intrigued academics from several fields. In particular, the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure has been investigated extensively. 
Majority of the previous studies have presumed homogeneity of the owners assuming that all 
owners have identical decision making objectives and motivation. However, it has been shown that 
owner identity has significant implications for corporate strategy and performance (e.g. Pedersen 
and Thomsen, 2000). This paper contributes to the existing knowledge on the implications of 
different owner identities by pointing out a link between owner identity and corporate 
diversification decision. In addition, this paper further investigates the association between 
corporate diversification and investor protection and demonstrates that the effect of owner identity 
on corporate decision making is dependent on the institutional environment
2
 where the company 
operates. 
Agency cost theory is among the most widely used explanations for the existence of corporate 
diversification. According to Amihud and Lev (1999) managers employ diversification strategies to 
diversify their own employment risk, and reduce firm risk at the expense of investors. 
Diversification also increases firm size which in turn might increase managers’ private benefits 
such as improvements in compensation schemes (Stulz, 1990). Accordingly, most of the studies 
(e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Chen and Ho, 2000; Lins and Servaes, 1999) show significant value 
losses related to corporate diversification strategies thus demonstrating a conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders. However, some academics have stirred the debate by 
uncovering the existence of diversification premium (Villalonga, 2004; He, 2009) which indicates 
that managers would actually drive shareholders’ interest when diversifying. Despite the mixed 
results for corporate diversification in general, the evidence on the value-reducing effects of 
unrelated diversification is virtually unanimous (see e.g. Rumelt 1974; Villalonga, 2004; Nayaar, 
1993).         
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) study the relationship between corporate diversification and ownership 
structure by considering the effect of the identity of the largest owner on the level of corporate 
                                                          
1
Diversification is a corporate strategy whereby a business builds its total sales by acquiring or establishing other businesses that are 
not directly related to the company's present product or market. In this paper the level of corporate diversification is measured based 
on the 2-digit SIC business segments where the company operates. This method is regarded to indicate the level of unrelated 
corporate diversification (see e.g. Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992).  
2 In this study ‘institutional environment/background’ refers to the effect of the legal origin of the country on the corporate decision 
making 
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diversification. They demonstrate that different ownership groups adopt diverse positions in 
monitoring and influencing corporate diversification. Ramaswamy et al. (2002) document that 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with the level of unrelated diversification, while 
ownership by banking groups and insurance companies is positively associated with the level of 
unrelated diversification. Moreover, Zhao (2010) shows that compared with other owner identities 
the level of diversification is higher in government owned Chinese firms. Zhang and Li (2006) 
further demonstrate that government owned Chinese firms tend to engage in value-reducing 
diversification strategies. Thus, it seems that not only managers, but also certain owner identities 
promote corporate diversification. 
Ownership concentration and legal and regulatory system are considered to be alternative vehicles 
to alleviate agency problems at national level. As large shareholders have strong incentives to 
monitor managers and power to enforce their will, concentrated ownership has been seen as an 
effective mean to attenuate the agency problem. The landmark study on the relationship between 
corporate diversification and ownership structure by Amihud and Lev (1981), documents that the 
absence of large block shareholders increases the number of unrelated acquisitions and the level of 
corporate diversification. However, the existence of large shareholders might bring forth other 
agency-related problems, notably the expropriation
3
 of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholder (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008).  
It is thus considered that the key corporate governance mechanism is the protection of outside 
investors through legal and regulatory system, which includes both the laws and their enforcement 
(La Porta et al., 2000). However, the extent of applicable laws and the enforcement of those laws 
vary a lot between countries.  In certain countries investors do not have the rights or proper means 
to enforce those rights in order to mitigate the harmful actions of corporate insiders
4
. Therefore, in 
countries where the degree of legal investor protection is lower, the degree of ownership 
concentration in firms tends to be higher (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). So to say, ownership 
concentration can be regarded as a substitute for legal investor protection in countries characterized 
by weak shareholder protection.  
 
                                                          
3  In general, expropriation is related to the agency problem documented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who focus on the 
consumption of perquisites by managers from the firm’s profits. It means that the corporate insiders use the profits of the firm to 
benefit themselves rather than return the money to the outside investors (La Porta et al., 2000). 
4 Corporate insiders are the ones who control the company. It does not necessarily require legal capability or majority of the votes to 
have control in the company. If no one controls the management managers can be corporate insiders without owning any shares. 
Likewise, large shareholders might not be corporate insiders if they do not have control over corporate actions (Blomqvist, 2008). 
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Furthermore, some academics claim that there exists a link between the effect of owner identity and 
institutional environment. Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) argue that the level of legal investor 
protection moderates the influence that ownership structure has on firm value. They suggest that the 
effect of ownership structure on firm value should be almost insignificant in countries where 
investor protection is high as the costs of diverting private benefits increase when investor 
protection is good. Thus, ownership structure would have less significant role when the law protects 
minority investors, and the differences between various owner identities should be smaller in 
countries with good investor protection. Contrary, in an environment of weak shareholder 
protection where private benefits are more easily captured, the objectives of the corporate insiders 
and the outside investors conflict significantly and expropriation is profuse. In this scenario certain 
owner identities would have even stronger influence on corporate affairs. 
The empirical evidence implies that corporate diversification, and unrelated diversification in 
particular, reduces firm value and thus represents a form of agency problem between corporate 
insiders and outside investors. In this paper I demonstrate that in addition to entrenched managers 
certain owner identities drive unrelated diversification. Further, I show that legal and regulatory 
system is a powerful corporate governance mechanism, which thus reduces unrelated corporate 
diversification. Finally, I argue that the effect of owner identity on corporate diversification 
decision depends on the institutional background and is more significant in countries where investor 
protection is weak.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION 
The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the effects of owner identity and investor 
protection on unrelated corporate diversification decision. The research question is three-fold: 
 (1) Do certain owner identities tend to engage in unrelated corporate diversification more 
than others? 
 (2) Does better investor protection reduce the level of unrelated corporate diversification? 
 (3) Does the effect of owner identity on the corporate diversification strategy depend on   
the institutional environment? 
This paper contributes to the existing corporate diversification literature in several ways. To date, 
evidence on the association between owner identity and the level of corporate diversification has 
been limited. Ramaswamy et al. (2002) study the relation in the Indian context while Hautz et al. 
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(2011) provide evidence on France, U.K. and Germany, thus leaving the comprehensive 
international evidence incomplete. I use a broader selection of countries to explore the relation 
between owner identity and the level of unrelated corporate diversification across countries.  
Second, I apply two specific investor protection measures in addition to the legal origin of the 
country, which has been used in previous corporate diversification studies. John et al. (2008) and 
Blomqvist (2008) measure the level of investor protection within a country with two variables, anti-
self-dealing index (ASD) and anti-director-rights index (ADR) when investigating the link between 
investor protection and corporate risk-taking. Similarly I include ASD and ADR variables into my 
model.  
Third, empirical evidence on the link between the effect of owner identity and institutional 
environment is very scarce. In their study Del Brio et al. (2011) examine the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate diversification strategy in an environment characterized with 
weak shareholder protection. However, their study covers only companies listed in the Spanish 
stock exchange and they do not differentiate between various owner identities. In this study, I both 
extend the sample to cover countries from all legal families (Common law, French civil law, 
German civil law and Scandinavian law), and distinguish between different owner identities. 
In addition, I introduce a new ownership group, private equity investors, which has not been, at 
least to my knowledge, investigated in any other study that looks into the association between 
unrelated diversification and owner identity. 
1.3 KEY RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS 
The regression results demonstrate that owner identity is a significant determinant of the level of 
unrelated corporate diversification. The results are robust especially for private equity owner 
identity demonstrating a strong negative association between the level of unrelated diversification 
and private equity ownership. Similarly, the level of unrelated corporate diversification seems to be 
significantly lower in institutionally owned firms, especially in Common law countries.  This is in 
line with previous findings suggesting a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
the level of corporate diversification (Hautz et al., 2011; Ramaswamy et al., 2002). 
Further, the statistics show that the level of investor protection seems to reduce the level of 
unrelated corporate diversification. Unrelated corporate diversification is most common in German 
and French civil law countries which are often characterized with weak investor protection, and 
least prevalent in Common law countries known for high level of investor protection. Accordingly, 
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the level of unrelated corporate diversification is lower in countries where ASD and ADR scores are 
higher. However, it seems that relative to the legal origin of the country investor protection indices 
are of second-order importance in explaining the level of unrelated diversification. 
Finally, the results indicate that the influence of owner identity on corporate diversification decision 
is dependent on the institutional background. In Common law countries the effect of owner identity 
on unrelated diversification is somewhat weaker than in continental European context (German and 
French civil law countries). This supports the argument that owner identity plays a smaller role in 
an environment characterized with good shareholder protection (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen, 2003; 
Blomqvist, 2008). Furthermore, not only the magnitude of the effect, but also the direction of the 
effect differs between Common law and continental European countries. In Common law 
environment institutional investors engage significantly less in corporate diversification than widely 
held firms while in continental Europe institutional investors is the only ownership category that is 
more associated with unrelated diversification than widely held firms. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that agency problems between managers and outside shareholders are more severe in 
continental European environment as, contrary to Common law context, all owner identities except 
for institutional investors engage less in unrelated diversification than widely held firms. This 
supports the assumption that ownership concentration acts as a substitute for legal investor 
protection in countries characterized by weak shareholder protection. 
However, the limitations of the study should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First, I 
use the identity of the largest shareholder as an approximate of firm’s ownership structure. Even 
though this is a widely used practice in research it does not capture the full extent of the ownership 
structure. As the focus is put only on the largest shareholder all the other owners are dismissed. 
This might cause some bias in the data as the influence of the largest owner might depend on the 
shareholdings of other owners. For example, in a company where ownership is very diffuse investor 
with only 5 percent shareholding might have a significant say in corporate affairs while in another 
company 20 percent ownership might not give any decision making power. Further, the method 
disregards the possibility that the largest shareholder owns the company through different sources. 
In addition, I do not track the ultimate owner of the company except for holding companies and 
cases where the identity of the owner is somewhat ambiguous. This might distort the data as the 
ultimate owner of the company might be different from the one stated in the database.           
Second, I use Thomson ONE Banker as the single source for the ownership data, and thus I have to 
rely on their owner identity classification. Hand-collected data from the proxy statements would 
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probably be a more reliable way to track the ownership structure. Finally, I look directly at the 
ownership share instead of the control rights of the largest owner. Ownership share demonstrates 
investor’s cash-flow rights which might in some cases differ greatly from the control rights that are 
more essential in regard with corporate decision making. As the focus of the study is to investigate 
the link between owner identity and corporate decision making it would be more appropriate to use 
control rights. However, information on control rights of owners is not readily available, and 
therefore I have to rely on ownership share as an approximation of decision making capacity.    
Finally, there has also been a lot of criticism towards SIC-code classifications that are used to 
calculate the diversification indices. The critics claim that SIC-code classification is inaccurate and 
fails to classify firms’ operations correctly into related and unrelated business segments. Villalonga 
(2004) even argues that diversification discount is an artifact of SIC segment data. However, most 
diversification studies continue to rely on SIC data despite its shortcomings.   
Although the study has above described limitations, the reliability of the results is not compromised 
due to the limitations. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical framework and 
previous empirical findings. The section is divided into four parts; the first covers existing literature 
on corporate diversification, second discusses findings on owner identity, third focuses on investor 
protection and final part presents evidence on the joint effect of investor protection and owner 
identity. Section 3 presents the hypotheses developed based on the literature documented in section 
2. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology applied in the analysis. Section 5 goes through the 
empirical findings that provide answers to the research questions. Section 6 introduces the results of 
robustness tests that are run to confirm the results obtained in the main analysis. Finally, section 7 
concludes the main findings of the study and makes suggestions for future research.   
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a theoretical framework and a review of the previous empirical evidence to 
shed light on the reasons behind corporations’ diversification choices. First, I discuss the agency 
theory explanation for corporate diversification and go through the previous findings on corporate 
diversification. Second, I look into owner identity and its role in the corporate diversification 
decisions. Third, I discuss possible investor protection measures to mitigate the agency problems 
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that cause unrelated corporate diversification. Finally, I review the joint effects of investor 
protection and owner identity on the level of corporate diversification.  
2.1 CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
This section provides the theoretical framework and previous empirical findings on corporate 
diversification. First, I shortly go through agency theory and its implications for corporate decision 
making. Second, I look into the previous literature on the level of diversification. Finally, I review 
the implications of corporate diversification on the firm value.  
2.1.1 Theoretical framework 
Jensen’s and Meckling’s (1976) model on the costs resulting from non-aligned interests of 
managers and shareholders holds a central role in the field of corporate governance. Building on 
financial theories developed by Adam Smith (1937) and Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and 
Meckling claim that utility maximizing managers will never fully act in line with the value-
maximization goal of shareholders. This misalignment of interests creates costs to both parties as 
owners have to encourage managers to act in their interest by monitoring managers or improving 
incentive alignment through instruments like managerial ownership or stock options. On the other 
hand, managers incur bonding costs as they have to convince the owners that they are acting in 
owners’ best interests. However, despite the efforts, the interests of the two parties are rarely 
aligned perfectly, thus resulting in lost firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).    
In examining corporate diversification, there are two prominent agency explanations on why 
managers choose to diversify (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). The first theory suggests that 
managers increase utility from diminishing the risk they face by diversifying as they typically hold 
large, undiversified positions in the firms they manage.  Managers who hold high equity positions 
encounter higher unsystematic risk from incentives, and thus diversify more to decrease that risk 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). May (1995) supports this assumption by documenting that CEOs with 
high equity stakes in the firm engage in more diversifying acquisitions. The second agency 
explanation assumes that managers diversify because they derive private benefits from it. There are 
several possible sources for these private benefits. Diversification may benefit managers due to the 
power and prestige related with managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986), because managerial 
compensation increases with firm size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), or because diversification makes 
the manager more valuable to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Contrary to findings in May 
(1995), Denis et al. (1997) document a lower level of diversification in firms where managers have 
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high equity holdings. The evidence would imply that higher equity holdings surrogate the private 
benefits that managers derive from diversification. 
However, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) deem both of the above agency explanations as 
incomplete. According to them the risk reduction model does not account correctly for the positive 
effects of incentives (managerial ownership), and thus fails to fully explain why diversification 
results from agency behavior. Similarly, the private benefits model fails as it does not explicitly 
include the costs associated with providing incentives. Thereby Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) 
present a modified model that incorporates the two agency explanations. When testing their model 
Aggarwal and Samwick confirm that diversification is indeed related to agency problems. However, 
their findings do not support the explanation that managers diversify to reduce their exposure to risk. 
However, they uncover strong evidence on the existence of private benefits of diversification. 
In addition to agency theory there exist several other theories that seek to explain corporate 
diversification. The resource-based theory (see e.g. Chandler, 1977; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1988) emphasizes the economies of scale and scope derived from diversification. According to this 
theory diversification is a norm in companies that have excess resources and ability to exploit those 
resource across industries through production and marketing synergies. Market power theory 
(Villalonga, 2000) suggests that by diversifying a company can use profits generated in one 
industry to support predatory pricing in another industry.  Several authors (see e.g. Weston 1970; 
Gertner et al., 1994) suggest that diversification is effective in creating larger internal capital 
markets. Especially capital-constrained firms should diversify in order to establish internal capital 
markets to better allocate capital within the firm.  
2.1.2 Evidence on corporate diversification 
Lins and Servaes (1999) study corporate diversification using a sample of firms from Germany, 
Japan and UK in 1994. They report that the prevalence of diversified firms is very similar in all 
three countries; Japan having slightly the highest proportion of diversified firms (40%) and 
Germany the least (36%). On the other hand Berger and Ofek (1995) report that 23 percent of the 
US firms are diversified. In his master’s thesis Walther (2003) examines the cross-section 
determinants of firm- and country-level corporate diversification by using a sample of firms from 
45 countries. Walther documents that unrelated diversification is highly prevalent across countries 
as 60 percent of his sample firms operate in more than one unrelated SIC segments. Walther (2003) 
further shows that firms operating in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and German-speaking 
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countries tend to be more diversified, while firms operating in English-speaking countries are 
significantly less diversified.  
As corporate diversification seems to be a norm around the world, it is interesting to look into its 
determinants. All studies investigating the determinants of corporate diversification report that 
diversification increases with firm size (e.g. Denis et al., 1997; Lind and Servaes, 1999, Berger and 
Ofek, 1995). Denis et al. (1997) also document that more mature firms that have firm-specific 
knowledge tend to diversify more. On the other hand Chen and Ho (2000) do not find evidence on 
the effect of firm-age and firm-specific knowledge on the diversification levels in Singapore. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) also find that diversified firms tend to hold on more debt in United States. 
This supports the argument that one of the advantages of diversification is that diversified firms are 
able to bear more on debt than single-segment firms. However, Lins and Servaes (1999) do not find 
differences in the debt levels of single-segment and diversified firms in Germany, Japan and United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, Walther (2003) demonstrates that level of diversification is higher in 
countries where earnings management is common. This might indicate that in these countries 
corporate insiders manage the earnings to cover their private benefits of diversification. Walther’s 
results also indicate a positive relationship between GDP growth and the level of corporate 
diversification. The possible explanation for this is that the fastest growing economies tend to be 
emerging markets where diversification has actually been shown to be beneficial (see e.g. Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000; Fauver et al., 2003). 
In addition to the determinants mentioned above the effect of ownership structure on the level of 
diversification has been widely researched. One of the most cited studies is by Denis et al. (1997), 
in which they provide evidence on the level of diversification for a sample of 933 U.S. firms. They 
document a strong negative relation between the level of diversification and the proportion of 
equity ownership of managers as well as the equity ownership of outside blockholders. Overall, 
their findings support the hypothesis that firms maintain value-reducing diversification strategies 
due to agency problems. In line with Denis et al. (1997), Chen and Ho (2000) discover a negative 
relationship between equity ownership of outside blockholders and the level of diversification in 
Singapore. Similarly, Walther (2003) reports a negative relation between the presence of a large 
shareholder and corporate diversification in a study covering 45 countries. 
Based on the above evidence it can be concluded that corporate diversification is prevalent around 
the world, yet the level of diversification seems to vary across countries. As corporate 
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diversification seems to be essential part of corporate strategy, it is intriguing to investigate the 
value implication of corporate diversification.   
2.1.3 Corporate diversification and firm value 
The connection between the level of corporate diversification and the value of the firm has 
generated substantial interest among the academics. Finance theory suggests that corporate 
diversification can be both beneficial and destructive for shareholder value. However, majority of 
the empirical studies report that on average the costs of diversification exceed the benefits.  
Several earlier studies (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994) report significant value 
losses related to corporate diversification strategies in the United States. More recently, Lins and 
Servaes (1999) demonstrate a significant diversification discount for companies located in Japan 
and United Kingdom, while Chen and Ho (2000) report identical results in Singapore. Similarly, 
Fauver et al. (2003) investigate the value effects of corporate diversification on a data set covering 
35 countries and find that diversified firms trade at significant discount relative to single-segment 
firms in developed countries. However, analogical results have been found in developing countries 
as well. Zhang and Li (2006) document that diversified government owned firms trade at discount 
in China. Accordingly, Lins and Servaes (2002) study a sample of firms from seven emerging 
markets in Asia and find that diversified firms trade at discount relative to single-segment firms.   
Nevertheless, there exists vast amount of literature suggesting that not in all cases is corporate 
diversification associated with value losses. Khanna and Palepu (2000) investigate the performance 
of diversified business groups in India and discover that highly diversified business groups tend to 
outperform single-segment firms. They suggest that as institutional voids in emerging markets 
make it costly for firms to deal with labor, product and capital markets, diversified firms can create 
value by mimicking the functions of institutions missing from the emerging markets. Similarly, 
Fauver et al. (2003) find no evidence on discount and in few cases even a notable diversification 
premium, in developing countries where capital markets are less developed and internationally 
integrated. Moreover, Lins and Servaes (1999) do not find evidence on diversification discount for 
firms located in Germany.  
In their article Campa and Kedia (2002) explore the value effects of diversification from an 
alternative perspective. They claim that firm’s diversification choice is a response to exogenous 
changes in firm’s operating environment that affect firm value. Firms that operate in industries with 
relative low growth and high exit rates are more likely to diversify away from those industries. 
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Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest that diversification is a value creating strategy for firms that 
actually pursue it. Basing on this theory Villalonga (2004) argues that diversified firms already 
trade at discount prior diversifying. Further, she claims that the evidence on the existence of 
diversification discount is a result of inconsistencies in the data reported in COMPUSTAT. He 
(2009) supports the arguments laid down by Villalonga (2004) and suggests that diversification 
discount documented in the earlier papers might be due to unreliable data or a failure to control for 
endogeneity. 
As it can be seen, academics seem to strongly disagree on the value implications of corporate 
diversification. However, most of researchers agree on the effect of unrelated diversification on 
firm value. The general implication is that low or moderate level of diversification is likely to be 
more beneficial for the firm. As the level of diversification increases segments tend to become more 
unique and unrelated. Accordingly, the evidence on the existence of diversification discount is more 
solid for unrelated diversification (often defined as business segments with different 2-digit SIC 
codes). Already Rumelt (1974) argued that related diversification is more beneficial for a firm than 
unrelated diversification as skills and resources can be utilized in related markets. In line with this, 
Nayaar (1993) documents that the advantages of positive reputation in existing business and the 
economies of scope are available in related but not in unrelated diversification. Further, Khanna and 
Tice (2001) argue that informational asymmetry between headquarters and divisions is less 
prevalent when business divisions are in related businesses.  Even the academics arguing against 
the existence of the diversification discount (e.g. Villalonga, 2004; He, 2009) admit that the 
possible premium applies only for related diversification. However, Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
argue that unrelated diversification might be beneficial in emerging markets. 
The literature on the value effects of corporate diversification is vast, yet inconclusive. However, it 
seems that the majority of the studies support the existence of diversification discount. Particularly 
the evidence on the value-reducing effects of unrelated diversification is virtually analogical.         
2.2 OWNER IDENTITY 
As La Porta et al. (1999) demonstrate ownership concentration is highly prevalent across countries. 
However, owners can be very different from one another based on the expectations they have and 
the level of monitoring they perform. This brings forth an interesting question on the effect that 
specific owner identity might have on the corporate diversification decision. Thus, this section 
provides a closer look in to the effects of owner identity on corporate decision making. First I 
discuss the evidence on owner identity in general. Second, I look into the relationship between 
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owner identity and firm performance. Finally the link between owner identity and corporate 
diversification is explored. 
2.2.1 Evidence on owner identity 
As mentioned earlier, the traditional view of the modern corporation as being widely held has been 
refuted by recent studies reporting the existence of ownership concentration across countries. La 
Porta et al. (1999) document that in the 27 countries they study only 36 percent of the firms are 
widely held, the threshold for control being 20 percent. Faccio and Lang (2002) study the 
ownership structure of Western European countries and report that widely held companies account 
for 37 percent of all companies. Further, they document that widely held companies are more 
common in United Kingdom and Ireland while family controlled firms are more prevalent in 
continental Europe. Besides, La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the identity of the largest owner 
across countries. Measured again with the 20 percent threshold for control, they document that of 
the sample firms 30 percent are family controlled, 18 percent government controlled, 5 percent have 
institutional owner and 3 percent are controlled by other corporation. The percentages for European 
sample reported by Faccio and Lang (2002) are 44, 4, 2 and 10 respectively.  
However, the variation in ownership structures is extensive across the countries. Most of the 
academics believe that the differences in investor protection explain the variation between countries.  
Accordingly, several studies document a strong positive relationship between the level of 
ownership concentration and the level of investor protection (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et 
al., 2008). La Porta et al. (1999) show that in countries where investor protection (measured with 
ADR1993) is above median, close to 50 percent of the companies are considered as widely held, 
while in countries where the score is below median only 27 percent are widely held. The figures for 
family controlled firms are 25 and 34 percent and for state controlled firms 12 and 22 percent, 
respectively.  
2.2.2 Owner identity and firm performance 
Although the association of ownership with diversification, growth and company performance has 
been broadly investigated, the differences between owner identities have not been adequately 
accounted for. Even though it has been shown that owners differ both in their power and 
performance goals, the literature linking owner identity and the economic performance of the 
company remains very limited.  
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Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) explore the association between ownership structure and firm 
performance with a sample consisting of the largest European companies. They find that owner 
identity is as important as ownership concentration in determining firm performance. The results 
also indicate that system effects influence the relationship between ownership structure and 
economic performance, which supports the view of La Porta et al. (2002) that ownership structure 
is dependent on the national institutions (e.g. legal and regulatory system). In the following 
paragraphs I review the implications of different owner identities on corporate strategy and 
performance. In line with Ramaswamy et al. (2002) I explore institutional, bank, corporate and 
government owner identities. Furthermore, I include family/individual and private equity ownership 
into the analysis. Institutional investors include insurance companies, retirement or pension funds, 
hedge funds, investment advisors and mutual funds. 
Family ownership has received significantly more attention in the literature than the other owner 
identities. It is often regarded that families are reluctant to give up control as they make large firm- 
specific investments in human capital (Maug, 1996). This in turn makes families committed to the 
survival of the company in long-term. On the other hand, family-owned companies are considered 
as rather risk averse because they have large proportion of their wealth invested in one company. 
The empirical evidence on the relation between family ownership and firm performance is 
inconclusive. Several authors demonstrate a positive relationship between family ownership and 
firm value (McConaughy et al., 2001; Mishra et al., 2001). Similraly, when studying a sample of 
U.S. firms Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family firms create value better than non-family 
firms. Wenyi (2011) provides similar evidence on emerging market as he documents a positive 
association between family ownership and firm value in Taiwan. He further shows that the relation 
is particularly strong when the family members manage the firm.  
On the other hand Claessens et al. (1999) find high conflicts of interest between outside investors 
and controlling family and in general inferior performance of family firms in East Asian economies. 
The authors suggest that the inferior performance might result from the extensive expropriation 
allowed by the regulatory environment. Similarly, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) document that on 
average the firm value of Malaysian family firms is lower than the value of non-family firms. 
Further, King and Santor (2008) find evidence that family owned firms that use dual-class shares 
have significantly lower valuations in Canada.  Several studies also find that there is no association 
between family ownership and firm performance (see e.g. Jayraman et al., 2000; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2003).  
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Institutional investors are argued to be highly concerned with shareholder value as they typically 
hold a large portfolio of shares at arms-length and are evaluated based on their financial results. 
Some academics even claim that strong performance orientation makes fund managers too short-
term oriented (see e.g. Brown et al., 1996). Empirical evidence indicates that institutional investors 
have positive impact on corporate performance.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) illustrate a positive 
link between institutional ownership and shareholder value. Similarly, Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2003) find evidence on the positive association between financial institution as the controlling 
owner and firm value. Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) study Spanish firms and discover 
that investment fund as the dominant owner has a positive effect on firm value.  
Companies may hold equity ownership in other companies as part of cross-ownership or company 
group structures. Corporate ownership is particularly characteristic of Japanese Keiretsu, French 
crossholding structures and emerging markets in general (Kester, 1992; Charkham, 1994; Khanna 
and Palepu, 1999). Corporate ownership may ease the access to valuable technology or other 
specific resources that might improve the value of the affiliated companies (Kester, 1992). 
Especially vertical integration is economically profitable when assets are very specific and 
transaction frequency is high (Williamson, 1996).  Further, it is generally considered that the parent 
company has stronger incentive to transfer proprietary resources to the subsidiary/affiliate it owns, 
which in turn is assumed to increase its firm value (Caves, 1996). Empirically, Pedersen and 
Thomsen (2000) find that company ownership has a negative effect on firm value in the largest 
European companies. They further demonstrate that corporate owners are concerned with growth 
and survival instead of shareholder value. Contrary, Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) document a 
positive relationship between corporate ownership and firm value in continental European countries.    
Banks are often involved in significant business relationships with companies they invest in. As 
banks may get notable income from these companies they might be reluctant to step in and prevent 
management from engaging in corporate action that might destroy shareholder value. Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) discover a negative relationship between controlling bank 
ownership and firm value. Contrary, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find a weak positive relation 
between bank ownership and firm value. Similarly, Cable (1985) documents a positive performance 
effect of bank ownership on West German firms.  
Theoretical explanation suggests that government ownership is mainly driven by social and political 
goals like output prices, employment and external effects. Many of these goals are often associated 
with poor financial performance and low firm value (e.g. Hart et al., 1997; Shepherd, 1989). Most 
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of the empirical studies document a lower performance of government-owned firms (e.g. Shirley 
and Walsh, 1998; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001). Similarly, Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) 
discover a negative relationship between government ownership and firm value and accounting 
profitability. However, some studies do not find any relationship between government ownership 
and firm value (e.g. Kole and Muhlerin 1997; Hausmann and Neufeld, 1991).   
In the previous studies investigating the role of owner identity private equity investors have been 
classified under institutional investors. However, it is intriguing to investigating them as a separate 
group as their investment strategy differs in some aspects from the traditional institutional investors. 
Private equity investors are described as “activist investors” who strongly seek to affect corporate 
decision making in order to increase company value. Private equity owners are claimed to be 
vigilant monitors as their target companies often experience an increase in R&D –expenditures, a 
sell-off of assets, a reduction in working capital and optimization of cash flows (Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens, 1990). Thus, it not surprising that Klein and Zur (2009) record positive announcement 
returns when the acquirer of voting rights is a private equity fund in the United States. Similarly, 
Stotz (2011) analyses short-term and long-term wealth effects of private equity investments in 
already listed target companies and discover risk-adjusted stock returns to be positive. Further, 
Tykyova and Borell (2012) demonstrate that the bankruptcy rates are lower in companies backed by 
experienced private equity investors. Contrary, Viviani et al. (2008) claim that private equity 
ownership has a negative influence on the long- run performance of their listed target companies.  
2.2.3 Owner identity and corporate diversification 
As demonstrated in the above section owners can’t be treated as homogenous group as they might 
have very differing objectives. According to Hautz et al. (2011) owners differ mainly on three 
measures being motivation, capabilities and control. The above mentioned dimensions are assumed 
to explain the differences in the effect of various owner identities on corporate diversification. Thus, 
this section considers in more detail how different owner identities pursue diversification strategies. 
It is generally considered that family firms’ main motivation is to ensure family ownership and 
involvement in firm operations as well as the long-term survival of the firm. In fear of losing 
control families might be unwilling to take on debt or issue shares to raise more capital (Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2003). Accordingly, Schulze et al. (2003a) suggest that as higher debt levels increase 
the risk of financial distress and loss of family control, family firms would be less willing to 
diversify and take on such debt.  Further, Schulze et al. (2003b) and McConaughy et al. (2001) 
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argue that family firms might diversify less because diversification requires external expertise and 
resources and family firms are less willing to allow outsiders’ affect their decision making.  
However, family-owned companies are in general assumed to engage in unrelated diversification 
more than other companies. As family owners want to retain control, they concentrate their 
investment in one firm and often have a large proportion of their wealth tied in the firm. 
Consequently, they can reduce their personal risk by reducing the firm risk through diversification. 
Further, corporate diversification can be used to reduce the volatility in earnings (Faccio and Stolin, 
2006) which increases the chance of firm survival (Casson, 1999). Miller et al. (2010) document 
that family-owned firms tend to pursue acquisitions that are outside their firm’s core industry. 
Further, Hautz et al. (2011) study 222 European firms and report a positive relationship between 
family ownership and the level of diversification. The reasoning and empirical evidence above 
indicates that family firms are more concerned with the firm survival and risk management than 
preserving wealth and control. 
Institutional investors are regarded as portfolio investors whose main objective is to increase 
shareholder value. They are also often characterized with low-risk aversion and long investment 
horizon. Institutional investors essentially invest ‘other people’s money’ and therefore have legal 
obligation to proactively protect their investments against value-reducing actions (David et al., 
1998).  Thus, institutional investors are expected to influence the diversification strategies that the 
managers wish to adopt. Consequently, is can be expected that the link between institutional 
shareholding and unrelated diversification is negative.  The empirical findings of Ramaswamy et al. 
(2002) and Hautz et al. (2011) support this argument. Ramaswamy et al. (2002) show that firms 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with the level of unrelated diversification in India. 
Similarly, Hautz et al. (2011) document a negative relation between financial institution ownership 
and the level of diversification in European firms.  
Corporate ownership usually originates from cross-ownership or group structure. The research on 
the association between corporate ownership and the level of diversification is limited as most of 
the studies focus on exploring group affiliation per se. Khanna and Palepu (2000) investigate group 
affiliation in India and discover that there is no difference in the level of diversification between 
group affiliates and non-group affiliates. Further, they demonstrate that around 80 percent of all 
affiliates (group/non-group) operate in one business segment. This would indicate that corporate 
ownership does not increase the level of diversification. Ramaswamy et al. (2002) characterize 
corporate owners as investors who have clear profit and growth objectives and cannot be affected 
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by organization’s managers. Therefore, they hypothesize that foreign corporate owners are 
negatively associated with unrelated diversification. However, they do not find significant 
relationship between the level of unrelated diversification and foreign corporate ownership.   
Unlike other institutional investors banks often have business relationship with firms they own. 
Usually they derive interest income from the loans they supply to the firms or obtain fees from the 
financial services they provide. As the banks are in a sense dependent on the firms that they own, 
they might be less active in monitoring and controlling the management. Thus, banks tend to 
support the managers and will be reluctant to prevent managers from making corporate strategy 
decisions that might be detrimental to shareholders (Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Ruiz-Mallorqui et al., 
2011). On the other hand, banks may prefer lower risk if they also provide credit to the firm. John et 
al. (2008) argue that banks might be able to effectuate these conservative investment policies as 
they often are the only provider of credit. Aggregating the above arguments, it could be assumed 
that bank ownership is positively associated with the level of unrelated diversification. The findings 
in Ramaswamy et al. (2002) support this argument by reporting a strong positive relation between 
bank ownership and the level of unrelated corporate diversification.   
As mentioned before, state ownership is strongly driven by political and social goals. Governments 
tend to favor low output prices, higher employment and positive externalities, that all may be 
related to weak performance and low corporate value (Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003). Further, state 
owned firms may prefer less risky projects to secure employment and social stability (Morck et al., 
2005).  According to Zhao (2010) reduction in the level of diversification leads to reduction in head 
count. Thus, business groups that have government as the controlling owner and a large employee 
base might have a political agenda to maintain low unemployment which may make them to 
maintain unprofitable diversification strategies. As government tends to track less closely the 
performance of the firms it owns (Andrews and Dowling, 1998), Zhao (2010) claims that 
government ownership lowers monitoring intensity, resulting in higher level of unrelated 
diversification. 
Contrary, Hautz et al. (2011) argue that the motivations for government ownership are likely to be 
context dependent. They claim that due to the increased international competition in Europe since 
the liberalization of trade policies governments’ favor focused product strategies as they are 
considered to be economically more effective. Thus, they predict a negative relationship between 
state ownership and corporate diversification.  Furthermore, Ramaswamy et al. (2002) study the 
relationship between owner identity and diversification in India and suggest that government 
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ownership is not related to the level of diversification due to the limited monitoring capability of the 
Indian state.  
There exists no relevant literature on the association between private equity ownership and 
corporate diversification. However, it can be assumed that private equity investors have very 
similar association with corporate diversification as institutional investors. Contrary to most 
institutional investors private equity investors seek to acquire majority stakes in target firms to 
ensure their say in corporate decision making (Andres et al., 2000). Andres et al. (2000) further 
point out that private equity investors usually hold sufficiently large stakes in the firms that it pays 
for them to invest resources into monitoring managers. Therefore private equity ownership is 
probably associated with even lower levels of corporate diversification than other institutional 
investors. Further, private equity investors main focus is to improve the operations of the company 
and increase the firm value. Thus, developing and reselling of a single-segment firm is probably a 
lot easier than of diversified firm.  
The above evidence reveals that the objectives and motivation of various owner identities differ 
significantly. Further, it supports the assumption that certain owner identities drive unrelated 
corporate diversification more than others. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to investigate the 
implications of different owner identities on corporate diversification decisions. 
2.3 INVESTOR PROTECTION 
As shown in the previous section corporate diversification, and unrelated diversification in 
particular, seem to reduce company value. One of the prevailing explanations for corporate 
diversification is the agency problems between corporate insiders and outside investors. Jensen 
(1993) proposes four categories of corporate governance mechanisms (Legal and regulatory 
mechanisms, Internal control mechanisms, External control mechanisms, Product market 
competition) that aim at reducing the costs resulting from agency problems. In this section two of 
the control mechanisms, legal and regulatory mechanisms and ownership concentration, which is 
one of the internal control mechanisms, are discussed in more detail. The focus is put on these two 
measures as they are considered to be the most prominent vehicles to alleviate agency problems at 
national level.   
2.3.1 Legal and regulatory mechanisms 
One of the fundamental remedies to the agency problems is the system of law and regulations that 
govern the firm. La Porta et al. (1999) claim that the differences among countries in ownership 
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concentration, breadth of capital markets, dividend policies and access to capital markets can be 
explained by the level of legal protection of investors from the expropriation of managers and 
controlling shareholders. The laws give the outside investors certain rights and means to protect 
their investment against the expropriation by insiders. 
Several academics have examined the legal rules covering the protection of outside investors and 
the enforcement of the rules across countries. La Porta et al. (1998) review and document the 
prevalence of a set of legal rules that protect investors in several countries. Based on these rules 
they compose two indices; first comprising the protection of shareholders (ADR 1993) and the 
second the protection of creditors. ADR1993 (anti-director-rights index) measures the level of legal 
protection of the shareholders against managers. La Porta et al. (1998) uncover significant 
deviations in the level of investor protection among countries. On average, investor protection is 
weakest in the French civil law countries while Common law countries have the strongest 
shareholder protection. German and Scandinavian law countries stand in the middle.   
Djankov et al. (2008) construct another measure of investor protection, ASD (anti-self-dealing 
index), which covers the expropriation of outside investors by corporate outsiders. According to 
them ASD is superior over ADR1993 in measuring investor protection as it better captures the level 
of minority shareholder protection against corporate insiders. The scores in ASD range from zero to 
one, a higher score demonstrating better outside investor protection. Common law countries score 
highest and French law countries lowest also when measuring with ASD. However, the values for 
German civil law, Scandinavian law and French civil law legal families are very close to each other. 
Djankov et al. (2008) also review the ADR1993to depict the legal situation in 2003. However, the 
results are very similar to those originally attained by La Porta et al. (1998). 
In addition to investigating the differences in investor protection across countries, several 
researchers have studied the implications of weak investor protection.  La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) claim that good investor protection enhances the development of 
financial markets by increasing the number of firms going public and increasing the equity market 
size. Several researchers provide evidence on the role of investor protection in corporate valuation. 
Empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al.; Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003) document a positive 
relation between higher valuation and investor protection claiming that this relation can explain the 
cross-country differences detected in the valuation levels of firms. It has also been widely shown 
that investor protection affects corporate decision making, among which the level of investment and 
corporate risk taking. Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that weak investor protection leads to high 
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endogenous risk-premium which in turn results in underinvestment.  On the other hand, John et al. 
(2008) and Blomqvist (2008) provide empirical evidence on the positive relation between corporate 
risk-taking and investor protection. According to John et al. (2008) the results demonstrate that 
better legal protection encourages firms to take on more risk as it mitigates the private benefits of 
control.  
Based on the above evidence it can be concluded that firms operate in very different institutional 
environments as investor protection differs significantly across countries. Further, empirical 
evidence suggests that investor protection has a significant impact on firm performance and value. 
This indicates that legal and regulatory system is an influential corporate governance mechanism 
and a fundamental determinant of the evolution of the corporate governance structure in a country.     
2.3.2 Ownership concentration 
Berle and Mean (1932) fixed the image of the ownership structure of the modern corporation for 
several generations. According to Berle and Mean corporations are widely held and the ownership 
is dispersed among several shareholders while the control is in the hands of professional managers.  
However, later studies have questioned the empirical validity of Berle and Mean’s perception of 
corporations being widely held.  
Several studies reveal significant ownership concentration across countries.  La Porta et al. (1998, 
1999) lay down systematic evidence on the ownership patterns across different countries.  La Porta 
et al. (1998) measure the ownership concentration in ten largest non-financial companies in 45 
countries and discover that on average three largest shareholders hold 46 percent of the company. 
They find the highest concentration in French law countries (56 percent) and lowest in the German 
civil law countries (34 percent). In another study La Porta et al. (1999) look at the ownership 
structure of twenty largest publicly listed companies in 27 most wealthy economies.  Using a 20 
percent threshold for control, La Porta et al. discover that only 36 percent of the sample companies 
are widely held. However, the results reveal strong variation in ownership structures between 
countries. In U.K, U.S. and Japan most of the companies are widely held (over 80 percent) while in 
Argentina, Austria and Belgium very few of the corporations are widely held (les s than 5 percent). 
As the evidence suggests that ownership concentration, even though at varying levels, is prevalent 
around the world, it is worthwhile to study the reasons why large shareholders exist. The most 
prominent theory is the one linking the prevalence of large shareholders to the level of investor 
protection. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) claim that highly 
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concentrated ownership is associated with poor investor protection and large shareholding can be 
seen as means to control entrenched managers. La Porta et al. (1999) provide evidence on the 
assumption by documenting that widely held companies are more common in countries with good 
investor protection. Thus, ownership concentration can be seen as a corporate governance 
mechanisms and a substitute for legal investor protection in countries characterized by weak 
shareholder protection.   
However, ownership concentration is not entirely solid medium of corporate governance. The 
evidence proposes that large shareholders seek both to increase the company value (shared benefits 
of control) and to enjoy benefits not available to other owners (private benefits of control) (Denis, 
2001). Private benefits of control refer to the non-aligned objectives of blockholders and minority 
shareholders as controlling shareholders do not need to take into account the opinions of other 
investors. Therefore, prevalence of controlling shareholders might bring forth other agency 
problems, namely the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder. It is 
thus considered that the key corporate governance mechanism is the protection of outside investors 
through legal and regulatory system, which includes both the laws and their enforcement (La Porta 
et al., 2000).    
2.3.3 Corporate diversification and investor protection 
Weak legal investor protection makes legal action against corporate insiders costly and thus enables 
corporate insiders to expropriate outside shareholders. Evidence on agency theory suggests that the 
private benefits of diversification mainly drive unrelated corporate diversification. Strong investor 
protection reduces the availability of these benefits, thus leading to less corporate diversification. 
Further, good investor protection narrows the gap between the interests of corporate insiders and 
outside shareholders. The arguments imply that undesired corporate diversification should be more 
prevalent in countries with weak legal investor protection where expropriation of outside investors 
by the corporate insiders is extensive.  
Walther (2003) uses the legal origin of a country as a proxy for investor protection and finds a weak 
negative relationship between the level of investor protection and the level of corporate 
diversification. The results provide some evidence for the assumption that higher investor 
protection has the potential to eliminate value-reducing projects such as corporate diversification 
programs. Fauver et al. (2003) argue that country’s legal system defines the level of investor 
protection, which in turn affects the availability and cost of external capital. Further, they claim that 
the availability and cost of acquiring external capital determine the value of corporate 
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diversification. The findings of Fauver et al. (2003) indicate that diversification might provide 
greater benefits/less costs for firms operating in countries belonging to French civil law, German 
civil law and Scandinavian law legal families. In line with the findings of Walther (2003) this 
suggests that the level of diversification should be higher in countries characterized with weak 
shareholder protection.   
Del Brio et al. (2011) investigate the effect of ownership structure on the level of diversification in 
a scenario of weak shareholder protection. They explore the relationship in Spain because French 
civil law countries are often characterized with weak investor protection. The results indicate a 
nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and diversification, which differs from the 
linear relationship found often for United States and United Kingdom firms. The differing behavior 
of Spanish firms is explained by the prevalent corporate governance mechanisms. In Spain the legal 
protection and market for corporate control are lower while the ownership concentration is 
significantly higher than in United Kingdom or United States. Del Brio et al. (2011) claim that 
mainly the high level of ownership concentration accounts for the differences since it enables large 
shareholders to expropriate rents. Del Brio et al. (2011) emphasize the severity of the agency 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders that may arise when investor 
protection is not guaranteed. Similarly, La Porta et al. (1998) claim that in many countries the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders might be more severe problem 
than the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
2.4 OWNER IDENTITY, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION 
This section investigates the relationship between owner identity and corporate diversification 
strategy in different institutional environments. As illustrated in the previous sections both the level 
of investor protection and the ownership structure of the company determine the level of corporate 
diversification. Further, La Porta et al. (1999, 2000) demonstrate that investor protection and 
ownership structure are intercorrelated aspects of corporate governance. Weak investor protection 
leads to the presence of large shareholders that monitor managers. However, high ownership 
concentration might lead to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders.   
It is argued that corporate insider’s decisions concerning the corporate strategy results from 
weighing the personal costs and benefits of different corporate strategies (Wright et al, 1996).  If 
insider’s costs related to less diversification, or benefits related to higher level of diversification are 
23 
 
mitigated by good investor protection corporate insiders are encouraged to engage less in unrelated 
diversification. Further, the evidence provided in the section 2.1.1 suggests that unrelated 
diversification is mainly driven by the private benefits derived by corporate insiders. Better investor 
protection reduces these benefits, and thus induces insiders to diversify less. Moreover, Blomqvist 
(2008) argues that mitigation of the private benefits of control by good investor protection makes 
corporate insiders more concerned with the economic performance of the company which is also in 
the interest of outside investors. Based on the above reasoning it can be concluded that the interests 
of corporate insiders and outside investors seem to be better aligned in an environment 
characterized with good investor protection.  
Del Brio et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence on the above argument as they investigate the 
effect of ownership structure on the level of diversification in Spain where investor protection is 
weak. As expected, Del Brio et al. (2011) report very high level of ownership concentration in 
Spain supporting the argument that ownership concentration compensates for the absence of 
investor protection. They also discover that entrenched managers increase the level of 
diversification and drive their own personal goals when investor protection is weak. Further, Del 
Brio et al. (2011) report serious conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Interestingly, they suggest that the agency problems between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders might be even more severe than the conflict of interests between 
managers and outside investors.   
On the other hand, Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) investigate whether the effect of ownership 
structure is dependent on the institutional environment. They claim that the influence of ownership 
structure on firm value should be small or insignificant in countries with good investor protection as 
the costs of diverting private benefits of control increase when investor protection is good. So to 
speak according to Thomsen and Pedersen ownership structure plays a smaller role when the law 
protects minority investors. This indicates that also the differences between various owner identities 
should be smaller in countries with good investor protection. Contrary, in an environment of weak 
shareholder protection where private benefits are more easily captured, the objectives of the 
corporate insiders and the outside investors conflict significantly and expropriation is profuse. In 
this scenario certain owner identities should have even stronger association with high level of 
unrelated corporate diversification. 
Empirical evidence on the link between the effect of owner identity and institutional environment is 
very scarce.  Ruiz-Mallorqui et al. (2011) study the relation between firm value and bank and 
24 
 
institutional investor ownership in an environment of weak legal investor protection. They find that 
in a context of concentrated ownership and weak legal protection of minority shareholders, 
controlling bank ownership leads to expropriation of minority shareholders. Furthermore, the 
authors conclude that the effect of bank ownership on the value of firm varies across different 
institutional environments. Similarly, Blomqvist (2008) argues that the effect of owner identity on 
corporate risk-taking depends on the institutional background. He demonstrates that the influence of 
owner identity on corporate risk-taking is stronger in countries with weak investor protection. On 
the other hand, Ruiz-Mallorqui et al. (2011) find a positive link between investment fund ownership 
and firm value in a scenario of weak shareholder protection. However, their results indicate that 
contrary to bank ownership the effect of investment fund ownership on firm value is not affected by 
the level of investor protection.  
Based on the reasoning above, it can be assumed that the institutional environment influences the 
effect ownership structure has on the level of diversification. More precisely, the theory and 
empirical evidence suggests that ownership structure plays a bigger role in countries where investor 
protection is weak. Therefore, it is interesting to test if the effect of owner identity on corporate 
diversification is dependent on the institutional background where the company operates.  
3 HYPOTHESES 
The previous section addresses a possible case for differentiating between owner identities and 
country contexts in determining the level of unrelated corporate diversification. This section 
provides theoretical justification leading to a set of hypothesis that relate investor protection, owner 
identity and corporate diversification. 
3.1 OWNER IDENTITY AND UNRELATED CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
Various owner identities have different strategic objectives and incentives and abilities to monitor 
corporate management as well as divergent attitudes towards portfolio risk, and thus different 
preferences for diversification strategies. Accordingly, Ramaswamy et al. (2002) and Hautz et al. 
(2011) show empirically that certain owner identities tend to participate in unrelated diversification 
more than others. In the following paragraphs I construct hypothesis on the relationship between 
different owner identities and unrelated corporate diversification. I form separate hypothesis for 
each of the owner groups being family, institutional, bank, corporate and government and private 
equity. 
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Families tend to be reluctant to give up control as they make significant firm-specific investments 
in human capital (Maug, 1996). This in turn makes families committed to the survival of company 
in long-term. Further, family-owned companies are rather risk averse because they have large 
proportions of their wealth invested in one company. On the other hand, the incentive alignment in 
family firms is good indicating effective mitigation of agency problems between managers and 
shareholders (James, 1999). However, empirical evidence shows that family-owned firms tend to 
engage in unrelated diversification more than other companies. As mentioned earlier families have 
large proportion of their wealth invested in one company which enables them to reduce their 
personal risk by reducing firm risk through diversification to unrelated business segments. Miller et 
al. (2010) show that family firms pursue acquisitions that are outside the firm’s core business. 
Further, Hautz et al. (2011) provide evidence on the positive association between family ownership 
and corporate diversification. Therefore, it can be hypothesized: 
H1: Family ownership is associated with higher level of unrelated corporate diversification  
Institutional investors are considered as portfolio investors whose main objective is increasing 
shareholder value. Since institutional investors do not have business relationship with the firms they 
invest in, they are likely to actively monitor the management and prevent them from engaging in 
wealth-destroying strategies. Institutional investors are also characterized with low-risk aversion 
and long investment horizon. Further, institutions can diversify away the unsystematic risk they 
undertake which suggests that diversification does not bring additional value to them. Ramaswamy 
et al. (2002) and Hautz (2011) provide empirical evidence on the negative relationship between the 
level of unrelated corporate diversification and institutional ownership. The second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: Institutional ownership is associated with lower level of unrelated corporate diversification    
Corporate ownership usually originates from cross-ownership or group structure. Both the 
theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence on the benefits of business group membership are 
mixed and inconclusive. Further, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find no difference in the level of 
diversification between group affiliates and non-group affiliates. Similarly, Ramaswamy et al. 
(2002) do not find statistically significant relationship between corporate ownership and the level of 
unrelated diversification. Thus, the hypothesis is following: 
H4: Corporate ownership is not related with the level of unrelated diversification  
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Contrary to institutional investors banks often have business relationship with firms they own. As 
the firms that banks own are also a source of income for them banks might be less active in 
monitoring and controlling the management. Further, banks may prefer lower risk if they also 
provide credit to the firm. According to John et al. (2008) banks might be able to effectuate these 
conservative investment policies as they often are the only provider of credit. This could lead to 
higher unrelated diversification as firm risk can be reduced by diversifying into unrelated business 
areas. Further, Ramaswamy et al. (2002) document a significantly positive relationship between 
bank ownership and the level of unrelated corporate diversification. Aggregating the above 
arguments, it can be hypothesized that: 
H3: Bank ownership is associated with higher level of unrelated corporate diversification 
State ownership is strongly driven by political and social goals. Government owned firms may 
prefer less risky projects to secure employment and social stability (Morck et al., 2005). Similarly, 
business groups that have government as the controlling owner and a large employee base might 
have a political agenda to maintain low unemployment which may encourage them to maintain 
unprofitable diversification strategies (Zhao, 2010). As the economic performance of the firm might 
not be government’s main objective (Andrews and Dowling, 1998), government ownership might 
decrease monitoring intensity resulting in higher level of unrelated diversification (Zhao, 2010). 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
H5: Government ownership is associated with higher level of unrelated corporate diversification   
Private equity firms are classified as “activist investors” who often hold large equity positions and 
actively seek to participate in the strategic direction of the company. Further, Gillan (2007) notes 
that activist investors try to bring about change within the company without a change in control if 
they are not satisfied with its management or operations. In addition, private equity investors are 
highly concerned with increasing the shareholder value of the companies they own. Thus, it can be 
assumed that private equity investors as owners do not wish to engage in unrelated diversification 
or even seek to reduce the level of diversification. Due to their large shareholding they also have the 
power to pursue their will. Thus, it can be hypothesized: 
H6: Private equity ownership is associated with significantly lower level of unrelated corporate 
diversification 
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3.2 INVESTOR PROTECTION AND UNRELATED CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
Agency theory claims that utility maximizing managers will never fully act in line with the value-
maximization goal of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Significant stream in research 
suggests that unrelated corporate diversification reduces firm value and is a result of agency 
problems between corporate insiders and outside investors. The extent to which corporate outsiders 
are expropriated by corporate insiders is determined by the level of investor protection in the 
country (John et al., 2008). This indicates that better investor protection would lead to lower level 
of outside investor expropriation, and thus lower level of unrelated corporate diversification.  
As documented in the section 2.3.1 legal and regulatory system is an effective corporate governance 
mechanisms as good investor protection seems to narrow the gap between the interests of corporate 
insiders and outside investors. Empirically (see e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003) it has been 
shown that diversification is mainly driven by the private benefits that corporate insiders derive 
from diversification. Legal investor protection mitigates agency problems by 1) improving 
monitoring 2) hindering outside investor expropriation 3) reducing the private benefits of control 4) 
contracting the power of non-equity stakeholders investor protection is good. Summarizing the 
above reasoning, it can be hypothesized that: 
H7: Higher level of investor protection is associated with lower level of unrelated corporate 
diversification 
3.3 OWNER IDENTITY, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND UNRELATED CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION  
Investor protection and ownership concentration are intercorrelated aspects of corporate governance 
(La Porta et al., 1999, 2000). Weak investor protection leads to the existence of large shareholders 
that control the management. However, the presence of blocholders might lead to possible conflicts 
of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the other hand, effective 
investor protection aligns the objectives of controlling shareholders and minority investors. Agency 
theory suggests that unrelated diversification is driven by the private benefits that corporate insiders 
derive from diversification. Good investor protection reduces the availability of these benefits, thus 
encouraging corporate insiders to diversify less.  
According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) the effect of ownership structure on firm value is 
smaller in countries where investor protection is good. This indicates that ownership structure is 
less important when the law protects minority shareholders. It can be further concluded that the 
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differences of the various owner identities are less evident in an environment of good legal 
protection. Contrary, weak investor protection renders private benefits of diversification readily 
available and might make the diversification objectives of certain owner identities more profound. 
Summarizing the above reasoning the hypothesis are as follows: 
H8: The impact of owner identity on the level of unrelated corporate diversification is higher in          
countries where investor protection is weak 
H9: The impact of owner identity on the level of unrelated corporate diversification is weaker in 
countries where investor protection is good 
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section I discuss the data and methodology used in the empirical analysis. First, I describe 
the data selection process and the final sample acquired for the empirical analysis. Second, I define 
the variables used in the analysis. Finally, I outline the methodology employed in the regression 
analyses.  
4.1 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The company information used in the analysis is obtained from the Worldscope database. 
Following Djankov et al. (2008) the sample includes countries from all four legal families being 
Common law, German and French civil law and Scandinavian law. As the data collection process 
includes manual work which limits the sample size, the countries are chosen based on the 
availability and reliability of the data. The initial sample consists of all listed companies from 18 
countries as of fiscal year-end 2010. Following previous studies on corporate diversification (see 
e.g., Denis et al. 1997; Lins and Servaes, 1999) I exclude all the companies whose main line of 
business is in the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999) or in the regulated utilities industry 
(SIC 4900-4999). Further, in line with Blomqvist (2008) all countries with less than 15 firm-level 
observations are excluded from the sample to prevent redundant influence of a single firm on 
country averages. The final sample includes companies from 14 countries of which four belong to 
the German civil law, four to the Scandinavian law, five to the French civil law and one to the 
Common law family 
The analysis is effectively a cross-section of the year-end situation in 2010 and most of the data is 
from 2010 financial statements. However, some of the control variables are calculated as 3-year 
averages (see section 4.2.4). Thus, all companies without sufficient data to calculate control 
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variables are excluded from the sample. In addition, companies for which there is no sufficient 
business segment sales data to calculate unrelated diversification proxy are left out from the sample. 
Further, if the business segment sales data does not match with the reported business segment SIC-
codes, company is left out from the sample. Finally, if there is no information on the largest owner 
or the reported owner identity is ambiguous, the company is excluded. The information on the 
identity and ownership share of the largest owner is manually collected from the Thomson ONE 
Banker database. After the above mentioned selection process the sample consists of 2,956 
company-level observations from 14 countries. The countries reviewed are United States from the 
Common law family Austria, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland from the German civil law family, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain from the French civil law family and Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden from the Scandinavian law family. 
4.2 EMPIRICAL VARIABLES 
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. The first part evaluates the association between 
investor protection and the level of unrelated diversification. Diversification is measured using the 
entropy approach (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) applied in 
most of the diversification studies. Measures for the level of investor protection are the same as the 
ones used by Blomqvist (2008). Firm- and country-specific control variables are retrieved from 
several studies investigating corporate diversification (e.g. Denis et al., 1997; Ramaswamy et al. 
2002; Goranova et al., 2007). The second part of the analysis investigates the role of ownership 
structure in corporate diversification decision. The diversification measure and control variables are 
identical to the first part. Impact of the ownership structure is measured with the identity of the 
controlling shareholder and the share of the ownership (see e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen, 2003). The 
third part investigates the joint effect of owner identity and investor protection on corporate 
diversification. The variables used in this part are same as in the first two parts. In the following 
paragraphs I describe in more detail the variables used in the analysis. First, I discuss the dependent 
variable which is the measure of the level of unrelated corporate diversification. Second, I go 
through the selection process of firm-level control variables and explain them in more detail. 
Finally, I present the country-specific control variables. Summary of all empirical variables is 
presented in table 1. 
4.2.1 Measures of corporate diversification 
As documented in the section 2.1.3 unrelated diversification in particular leads to diversification 
discount and destroys shareholder value. Thus, the analysis focuses on explaining the level of 
30 
 
unrelated diversification. Diversification is usually measured using both the Herfindahl index 
approach
5
 (Acar and Sankaran 1999; Herfindahl, 1950) and the entropy index approach (Hoskisson 
et al., 1993; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). However, some of the previous studies (see 
e.g. Ramaswamy et al., 2002) show that the entropy measure and the Herfindahl index are highly 
correlated. Therefore, only the entropy measure is applied in the main analysis. The unrelated 
entropy index is calculated by using business segment (measured at 2-digit SIC code level) sales 
data in 2010 obtained from Worldscope database. Entropy index bases the unrelated diversification 
of the firm on the number of segments and the relative weight of each segment with respect to total 
firm sales as shown in equation 1 
        ∑   
 
      ( 
 
  
)                                                                                                                       (1)          
where DIVER1 is the measure of firm’s unrelated corporate diversification,    is the proportion of 
the sales in the ith segment and N is the number of two-digit SIC segments where the firm operates. 
A higher value of DIVER1 implies higher level of unrelated corporate diversification. If the firm 
operates in single 2-digit SIC segment, DIVER1 receives a value of zero. 
4.2.2 Measures of investor protection 
Following Blomqvist (2008) I use anti-self-dealing index (ASD) and anti-director rights index 
(ADR) to measure the level on investor protection. It is important to keep in mind that my analysis 
covers the fiscal year-end situation in 2010 while the measures of investor protection have been 
constructed earlier. Both ASD and ADR are based on the situation in 2003. However, John et al. 
(2008) note that changes in legal environment tend to be slow, and thus using indices based on the 
situation in 2003 will unlikely distort the results. Further, Blomqvist (2008) documents a relatively 
high correlation between the original ADR1993 and the revamped ADR2003 which indicates that 
the indices withstand time. In addition to the indices constructed by the academics, I use the legal 
origin of the country as a measure of investor protection. 
The revamped ADR is based on the legal situation in 2003. The index measures the stance in the 
country towards minority shareholders, but it does not explicitly address the question of investor 
expropriation. The ADR score ranges from one to six depending on the inclusion of investor 
protection clauses in the mandatory legislation of the country. For each of the minority shareholder 
                                                          
5The sales-based Herfindahl index of diversification is    ∑   
   where   id the proportion of firm’s sales in industry segment i. 
The closer the Herfindahl index is to one, the less diversified is the firm. However, in Table 1 Herfindahl index is scaled in order to 
be comparable with Entropy index. In Table 1 the closer the index is to 1 the more diversified is the firm.  
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rights included in the legislation, a country receives one point. The six aspects included in the index 
are 1) possibility of proxy vote by mail 2) deposition of shares prior to shareholder’s meeting is not 
required 3) cumulative voting or proportional representation in the board 4) legal mechanisms 
against expropriation of minority shareholders by managers 5) right to call a special shareholders 
meeting 6) pre-emptive rights to subscribe for equity issued by the company.  
Djankov et al. (2008) construct a new index describing legal protection of outside investors against 
expropriation by corporate insiders. The index is computed for 72 countries based on the legal 
situation in 2003 and comprises of private enforcement mechanisms such as disclosure, approval, 
and litigation that govern a certain self-dealing transaction. A country is assigned a score ranging 
from zero to one for both ex-ante and ex-post control of self-dealing. The final index value is the 
average of these two scores. As Djankov et al. (2008) claim that ASD works better than the 
previously introduced ADR and Blomqvist (2008) regards it superior over the other measures, I 
also use ASD as the main indicator of investor protection. 
In addition to the above mentioned indices, different legal families (Common law, French civil law, 
Scandinavian law, German civil law) are used as additional measures of investor protection in some 
of the regressions. Legal families are included as dummy variables that are assigned a value of one 
if the firm belongs to the specific legal family and zero otherwise. The level of legal protection 
differs significantly across the various legal families (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al. 
2008). It is thus interesting to examine whether the investor protection indices have predictive 
power over the impact of the legal families.  
4.2.3 Measure of owner identity 
According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) the identity of the largest shareholder is a rather good 
approximate of the ownership structure of a firm. In the analysis I use the identity of the largest 
owner to capture the influence of ownership on the corporate diversification decisions. Following 
Blomqvist (2008) I use two different ownership classifications in the analysis.  First, I use the 
identity of the firm’s largest shareholder to categorize the firms as being widely held, 
family/individual, institutional, bank, government and private equity owned. If the largest owner 
controls less than 10 percent, the company is expected to be widely held. Second, I categorize the 
firms using only the identity of the largest owner and not accounting for the ownership share. It is 
assumed that the first method will generate more robust results as 10 percent ownership gives 
significant say into the corporate affairs. The second method is used to explore whether owner 
identity has more influence on corporate decision making than ownership share.  
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4.2.4 Firm-level control variables 
On the firm level, I control for size, leverage, capital intensity and prior performance. The variables 
have been collected from previous studies exploring the level of corporate diversification. The 
variables chosen are the ones that have been used the most and have been shown to best explain 
corporate diversification. The first control variable is Firm size which is relevant as the theory 
suggests that diversification is pursued to gain scale and scope economies, market power and 
improve resource availability (see e.g. Chandler, 1969; Grant et al., 1988). Further, several studies 
show that the size of the firm is positively associated with the level of diversification (see e.g. Denis 
et al., 1997; Fauver et al., 2003; Lins and Servaes, 1999). To control for any firm size effects I 
include the natural logarithm of total assets to the equation. The second control variable is leverage. 
Some studies show that the diversification strategy of the company is affected by its capital 
structure (see e.g. Kocchar and Hitt, 1998). On the other hand, theory suggests that one of the 
benefits of diversification is the firm’s ability to bear more debt. Further, academics have presented 
the potential of debt in reducing agency costs (see e.g. Grossmann and Hart, 1986). Thus, it can be 
assumed that leverage in some way affects corporate diversification decisions. Following 
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) leverage is calculated as a 3-year (2008-2010) average of the firm’s debt 
to equity ratio.  
Capital intensity is measured as the 3-year (2008-2010) average of firm’s capital expenditures to 
sales ratio. Capital intensity controls for the differences in production capabilities, firm-specific 
knowledge and firm’s ability to generate sales from its investments, which all have been shown to 
affect firm’s willingness to pursue diversification (see e.g. Denis et al., 1997; Hutzschenreuter and 
Goene, 2009a, 2009b). Finally, prior performance is included as the last firm-level control variable 
as firms with weak profitability are more likely to diversify to other markets to seek new 
opportunities (Campa and Kedia, 2002). In line with Ramaswamy et al. (2002) prior performance is 
measured as a 3-year (2008-2010) average of return on assets. To control for the differences 
between countries firm-level return on assets is indexed against the average return on assets of the 
country.  
Following a common practice in the diversification literature I include industry dummy variables to 
control for industry-specific effects. In line with Denis et al. (1997) I control for industry 
membership based on the primary 2-digit SIC code of the firm. The industry dummy is assigned a 
value of one if the firm belongs to the specific industry group, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 1 - Summary of the Empirical Variables 
 
Variable Proxying for Description Source
Dependent variable
DIVER1 Level of unrelated corporate
diversification
Calculated using the Entropy measure:                                                                                                                       Jaquemin and Berry (1979)
Ownership variable
Identity of the largest shareholder                   Ownership structure of the firm A dummy variable which receives a value
of one if the firm’s largest shareholder
owns at least 10 percent and the owner
belongs to the equivalent owner identity
group, and zero otherwise
Thomsen and Pedersen
(2000)
Investor protection variables
Anti-director-rights index (ADR) Shareholder's decision making
rights in a country
A country receives ADR score ranging
from zero to six depending on the
inclusion of minority shareholder
protection clauses in its manadatory
legislation.
La Porta et al. (1998);
Djankov et al. (2008)
Anti-self-dealing index (ASD) Outside investor expropriation in
the country
Country gets a score ranging from zero to
one for both ex-ante and ex-post
protection of outside investors. ASD is
the average of the two measures.
Djankov et al. (2008)
Legal family The effect of the legal origin of
the Company law or Commercial
code of given country to the level
of investor protection
A dummy variable that is assigned a value
of one if the firm belongs to the
corresponfding legal family, and zero
otherwise
La Porta et al. (1998,1999)
Firm-level control variables
Assets Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets e.g. Denis et al. (1997)
Leverage Firm's capital structure 3-year (2008-2010) average of the firms's
Debt to Equity ratio
Ramaswamy et al. (2002);
Kocchar and Hitt (1998)
Capex Capital intensity; differences in
production capabilities, firm-
specific knowledge and firm’s
ability to generate sales from its
investments
3-year (2008-2010) average of firm's
Capital expenditures to Sales -ratio
Hutzchenreuter and Goene
(2009a, 2009b)
ROA Firm's profitability in the past 3-year (2008-2010) average of Return on
Assets
Campa and Kedia (2002);
Ramaswamy et al. (2002)
Two-digit primary SIC-code Industry effects on corporate
diversification
A dummy variable that equals one if
firm's primary business segment falls into
the corresponding two-digit SIC-code and
zero otherwise
e.g. Denis et al. (1997)
Country-level control variables
GNP Capital market development Average GNP per capita in the country in
2010
Fauver et al. (2003)
Earnings smoothing (ES) Indication of the existence of
private benefits of diversification
Median of the ESfirm (ratio of STDV of
operating income to the STDV of
operating cash flow, both variables scaled
by total assets) for each country
Leuz et al. (2003)
This table presents the empirical variables used in the regression analysis. The first column indicates the name of the variable, second column
indicates what the variable is proxying for in the analysis, third column provides a brief describtion of the variable while the last column provides
the source of the variable. 
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4.2.5 Country level control variables 
Fauver et al. (2003) demonstrate that the value of corporate diversification is negatively related to 
the level of international capital market integration and capital market development as in countries 
where capital markets are established they document a diversification discount. Contrary, Fauver et 
al. (2003) find no diversification discount, and in some cases even diversification premium, in 
countries where capital markets are less developed and internationally integrated. Following Fauver 
et al. (2003) I use the average GNP per capita to proxy for the level of capital market development.  
Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that earnings management is more prevalent in countries where investor 
protection is weak. Similarly, the results in Walther (2003) indicate that the level of diversification 
is higher in countries where earnings management is common. This might imply that corporate 
insiders of diversified firms derive private benefits that they attempt to hide by earnings smoothing. 
Therefore, I include a country-level earnings smoothing variable into the regression. Earnings 
smoothing is calculated as the ratio of standard deviation of the operating income to the standard 
deviation of operating cash flow, both scaled by total assets. A higher value implies lower earnings 
smoothing. Median of the firm-level earning smoothing variables is used as the country-level 
control variable. 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
In this section I describe the methodology applied in the empirical analysis. First, I discuss the 
methodology used in the analysis of the link between owner identity and corporate diversification. 
Second, I go through the methodology used in the analysis of the relation between the level of 
unrelated corporate diversification and investor protection. Third, I look into the methodology used 
in the examination of the influence of owner identity on corporate diversification in different 
institutional backgrounds.  
4.3.1 Owner identity and unrelated corporate diversification 
Weighted least squares regression for the whole sample at 10 percent control threshold 
The first regression explores the link between owner identity and the level of unrelated corporate 
diversification and aims at verifying the hypothesis 1-6. In line with the methodology used in 
Pedersen (2000, 2003) I regress the unrelated corporate diversification measure on the identity of 
firm’s largest shareholder. Firms in which the largest shareholder holds less than 10 percent are 
considered as widely held. In the regression widely held companies are considered as the base 
category against which the other owner groups are assessed. As there is significant variation in the 
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number of firms from specific countries, John et al. (2008) weight each firm-level observation with 
an inverse of the number of observations from the equivalent country. I apply this methodology as 
well. Mathematically: 
                                                                         
                                                                                                                       (2) 
where DIVER1 is the measure of unrelated corporate diversification and Di is a dummy variable 
which receives a value of one if the firm’s largest shareholder owns at least 10 percent and the 
owner belongs to the equivalent owner identity group, and zero otherwise. Xc is a vector for 
country-level control variables and Yi is a vector for firm-level control variables.  
I expect all δ₂, δ₃, δ₄, δ₅, δ₆ a d δ₇ to be negative. This in line with the findings of several previous 
studies (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Denis et al, 1997) that the existence of controlling shareholder 
reduces the level of unrelated diversification. Thus, the expropriation of outside investors would be 
highest in widely held firms.  However, I assume δ₃ and δ₇ to be significantly more negative than 
the other coefficients. This would indicate that firms owned by institutional investors and private 
equity firms engage less in unrelated diversification, and thus destroy less shareholder value than 
other owner identities. Contrary, I expect the coefficients δ₂, δ₅, and    to be less negative than δ₄. 
This would imply that family, bank and government owned firms drive unrelated diversification 
more than corporate owners. Following Blomqvist (2008) I run the above regression controlling 
also for the level of investor protection, countries and legal families.  
Weighted ordinary least square regression for owner identities 
Again, in line with Blomqvist (2008) I leave out the ownership share of the largest owner and 
regress unrelated diversification measure only on the identity of the largest shareholder. 
Institutional ownership is considered as the base category against which all the other owner 
identities are compared. The equation is as follows: 
                                                                              
                                                                                                                                           
where DIVER1 is the measure of unrelated corporate diversification and Di is a dummy variable 
which receives a value of one if the firm’s largest shareholder belongs to the equivalent owner 
identity group, and zero otherwise. Xc is a vector for country-level control variables and Yi is a 
vector for firm-level control variables. I expect γ₆ to be negative which would support the 
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assumption that private equity ownership is least associated with unrelated diversification of all 
owner identities. Contrary, I believe γ₂, γ₃, γ₄ and γ₅ to be positive indicating that family, bank, 
corporate and government owned firms engage more in unrelated corporate diversification than 
institutionally owned firms. As in the previous part I run the regression controlling also for the level 
of investor protection, countries and legal families. 
4.3.2 Investor protection and unrelated corporate diversification 
Weighted ordinary least squares regression for the whole sample 
The second part of the analysis addresses the hypothesis on the relation between investor protection 
and the level of unrelated corporate diversification. John et al. (2008) regress corporate level risk-
taking measure on measures of investor protection and chosen control variables. I follow the 
methodology applied in this study, but use the unrelated diversification measure, DIVER1, as the 
dependent variable and regress it against the control variables described in the previous section. As 
in the first part, each observation is weighted with the inverse of the number of observation from 
the equivalent country.  The regression equation is as follows  
                                                                                                    (4)                  
where DIVER1 is the measure of unrelated corporate diversification and InvestorProtectionc,i refers 
to ASD and ADR indices that capture the protection of outside investors in country c where firm i is 
located. Xc is a vector for country-level control variables and Yi is a vector for firm-level control 
variables. As hypothesized I expect the sign of α2 to be negative. This would indicate that better 
investor protection leads to lower level of unrelated corporate diversification.   
Following Blomqvist (2008) I regress unrelated corporate diversification measure on the collection 
of investor protection variables and dummy variables standing for legal families. As the level of 
investor protection differs considerably between the legal families, it is interesting to measure the 
predictive power of investor protection measures relative to the impact of legal families. In the 
regression Common law legal family is designated as the reference group to which other legal 
families are compared. The equation is following: 
                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                       (5)                 
where DIVER1 is the measure of unrelated corporate diversification and InvestorProtectionc,i refers 
to ASD and ADR indices that capture the protection of outside investors in country c where firm i is 
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located. Dc is a dummy variable that receives a value of one if a firm belongs to the equivalent legal 
family, and zero otherwise. Xc is a vector for country-level control variables and Yi is a vector for 
firm-level control variables. In line with the findings in Blomqvist (2008) I assume that β₂ will stay 
negative. This implies that the collection of investor protection measures would have predicting 
power on corporate diversification strategies over the legal origin of the country.  
4.3.3 Owner identity, investor protection and unrelated corporate diversification  
This section aims at providing evidence on the hypothesis 8 and 9. The assumption is that owner 
identity has more influence on corporate strategy, such as diversification decision, in an 
environment characterized by weak shareholder protection. In line with Blomqvist (2008), I assess 
this hypothesis by running the regressions (1) and (2) separately for Common law sub-sample and 
continental European sub-sample which consists of French and German civil law countries. In 
regression 6 widely held firms act as the reference group while in regression 7 institutional 
investors is the omitted owner identity category. Also in this part each observation is weighted with 
inverse of the number of observations in the corresponding country. The equations are as follows: 
 
                                                                         
                                                                                                                  (6) 
             
                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
where DIVER1 is the measure of unrelated corporate diversification. In the equation (6) Di is a 
dummy variable which receives a value of one if the firm’s largest shareholder owns at least 10 
percent and the owner belongs to the equivalent owner identity group, and zero otherwise. In the 
equation (7) Di is a dummy variable which receives a value of one if the firm’s largest shareholder 
belongs to the equivalent owner identity group, and zero otherwise. Yi is a vector for firm-level 
control variables.  
It has been shown that investor protection is weaker and expropriation more prevalent in civil law 
countries (see e.g. La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al., 2008). Further, Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000, 2003) demonstrate that ownership structure might be less important in countries where the 
level of investor protection is high. Thus, I expect the coefficients θ₃ and θ₇ to be significantly 
negative in the continental European sample. Similarly, I assume coefficients θ₂, θ₄, θ₅ and θ₆ to be 
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negative as the literature suggest that ownership concentration reduces agency problems. However, 
I expect the coefficients to be significantly less negative than the institutional and private equity 
investor coefficients. In the Common law sub-sample I expect the coefficients to have similar signs 
but to be a lot smaller and statistically less significant. For the equation (7) I expect all ц₂, ц₃, ц₄ 
and ц₅ to be positive in civil law countries. Contrary, I predict a strong negative sign for the 
coefficient ц₆. Again, I expect the coefficients to have identical signs, but to be notably smaller and 
less significant in the Common law sub-sample. 
5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study. First, I provide a description of the sample 
statistics. Second, regression results are discussed in regard with the hypotheses and previous 
findings in the literature.  
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, I first discuss the summary statistics for the dependent variable and the control 
variables included in the model. Second, I go through the descriptive statistics regarding owner 
identity. Finally, I present statistics jointly for owner identity and unrelated corporate diversification.  
5.1.1 Sample summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. The sample 
consists of 2,956 firms from 14 countries. United Stated is the only country from Common law 
legal family, while there are four countries from German civil law and Scandinavian law family and 
five from French civil law family. Common law legal family has the most observations (1,934) in 
the sample. German civil has 409, French civil law 401 and Scandinavian law 212 firms in the 
sample. The most represented countries in the sample are United States (1,934), Germany (202) and 
France (191) while Austria (16), Norway (29) and Denmark (37) have the least observations. 
Measured with the sales-based Entropy and Herfindahl indices, the level of unrelated corporate 
diversification is significantly highest in German civil law countries. French civil law and 
Scandinavian law follow behind while in the sole Common law country, United States, the level of 
unrelated diversification in considerably lower. The difference between Common law and other 
legal families is statistically significant. Similarly, German civil law firms are statistically 
significantly more diversified into unrelated businesses than firms in French civil law and 
Scandinavian law countries. At the country level Switzerland (0.41) and Germany (0.31) have the 
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highest level of unrelated corporate diversification, while firms located in the United States (0.14) 
and Sweden (0.17) are on average least diversified into unrelated businesses. 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
 
Country N DIVER1 DIVER2 ROA Capex Leverage Assets ($M) ES country GNP ($) ADR ASD
US 1,934 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.58 3,080 1.34 49,516 3.00 0.65
Common law 1,934 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.58 3,080 1.34 49,516 3.00 0.65
Austria 16 0.24 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.82 4,030 1.70 36,660 2.50 0.21
Germany 202 0.31 0.19 0.02 0.09 1.06 6,651 1.20 37,591 2.50 0.28
Poland 107 0.22 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.37 424 1.26 19,747 2.00 0.30
Swizerland 84 0.41 0.25 0.08 0.09 0.57 4,665 1.33 46,215 3.00 0.27
German Civil law 409 0.30 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.71 2,608 1.26 39,874 2.50 0.27
Belgium 39 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.82 1,574 0.77 37,448 2.00 0.50
France 191 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.83 5,746 0.98 33,820 3.00 0.38
Italy 67 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.88 2,154 1.05 31,555 2.50 0.39
Netherlands 53 0.29 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.40 9,946 1.09 42,475 3.00 0.21
Spain 51 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.18 1.47 5,090 0.90 32,070 5.00 0.37
French civil law 401 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.88 4,902 0.97 35,474 3.10 0.37
Denmark 37 0.28 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.68 994 1.07 39,558 4.00 0.47
Sweden 85 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.55 1,697 1.22 36,660 3.50 0.34
Norway 29 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.25 0.91 1,272 1.05 56,894 3.50 0.44
Finland 61 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.55 2,248 0.93 38,947 3.50 0.46
Scandinavian law 212 0.20 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.67 1,553 1.09 43,015 3.63 0.43
Total sample 2,956 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.75 3,541 1.26 38,511 3.07 0.38
Common vs. German civil law -8.23*** -8.19*** 0.35 -0.03 -0.18 1.43 0.64 - - -
Common vs. French civil law -5.50*** -5.23*** 1.38 -0.01 -0.46 -3.99*** 4.58*** - - -
Common vs. Scandinavian law -2.44** -2.40** 0.21 -0.03 -0.14 4.74*** 3.00*** - - -
German vs. French civil law 2.54** 2.65** 1.00 0.46 -0.54 -4.29*** 2.22** - - -
German vs. Scandinavian law 3.52*** 3.51*** -0.00 -0.03 0.12 3.05*** 1.28 - - -
French vs. Scandinavian law 1.43 1.31 -0.67 -0.29 1.03 6.74*** -1.21 - - -
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
T-test of legal family means
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. N is the number of companies per country in the sample. DIVER1 and DIVER 2 are the 
unrelated diversification proxies. DIVER 1 is the country average of the firm-level sales-based Entropy index while DIVER2 is the country average of
the firm-level sales-based Herfindahl index. For both measures a higher value indicates a higher level of unrelated corporate diversification. ROA is a
proxy for prior performance and is a 3-year (2008-2010) country average of return on assets. Capex  proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2008-
2010) average of capital expenditures-to-sales ratio, measured at the country-level. Leverage presents the capital structure and is a 3-year (2008-2010)
country average of firm-level debt-to-equity ratio. Assets demonstrates the average firm size in the country, measured as the nathural logarithm of
assets as of 2010. ES country is the country median of the earnings smoothing variable calculated as the ratio of firm-level standard deviation of operating
income and operating cash-flow, both scaled by assets. Higher ES country indicates less earnings smoothing in the country. GNP is the cross national
product per capita in 2010 in $US and demonstrates the level of stock market development in the country. Anti director-rights index (ADR) and anti
self-dealing index (ASD)  are measures of investor protection. 
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In regard with the performance of firms there seems to be no significant differences between the 
legal families. At the country level the highest average return on assets (ROA) is in Switzerland 
(8%), and lowest in Norway (0%). The surprisingly low average return on assets in Norway is 
probably a bias resulting from the small sample size. The average return on assets of the whole 
sample is 4%.  
Similarly, there is no high variation in the capital expenditures to sales ratio (Capex) between the 
legal families. However, there exist wide variations between the individual countries. Firms in 
Norway (25%), France (18%) and Austria (18%) have very high capital expenditures to sales –
ratios while the average ratio in Belgium is only 8%.    
In regard with debt to equity ratio (Leverage) the differences between legal families are more 
prominent. The firms located in French and German civil law countries bear very high levels of 
debt the averages being 88% and 78%, respectively. The ratios are lower, yet relatively high also in 
Scandinavian law (67%) and Common law (56%) counties. High debt to equity levels across legal 
families are likely explained by the effect of worldwide financial crisis on corporations. During the 
past three years firms have encountered a challenging business environment which has diminished 
their profit-making capability. By 2010 the losses or reduced profits might have cumulated to the 
extent that they reduce the amount of shareholders’ equity which results in inflated debt to equity 
ratios. For example in Spain, which has encountered a lot of difficulties during the crisis the 
average debt to equity ratio is staggering 147%. 
The average firm size in the sample is highest in the French civil law countries. The result is mainly 
driven by Netherlands where firm total assets are on average almost $10 billion. The average firm 
size is clearly smallest in Scandinavian law countries, the average total assets of a company being 
only $1.6 billion. In addition to large differences between legal families the variation within legal 
families is significant. The average firm size in Poland is only $0.4 billion while in Germany the 
firm assets total on average $6.7 billion. Similarly, the average size of firms located in Denmark 
($0.9 billion) falls significantly below the Scandinavian legal family average.   
A higher value for earnings smoothing variable indicates lower level of earnings smoothing. It 
seems that earnings smoothing is most prevalent in French civil law countries (0.97) and least 
universal in Common law countries (1.34). This is in line with Leuz et al. (2003) who suggest that 
earnings management is more prevalent in countries where investor protection is weak. However, 
earnings management is more common in Scandinavian law countries (1.09) than in German law 
countries (1.26). At a country-level the level of earnings smoothing is lowest in Austria (1.70), 
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Switzerland (1.33) and United States (1.34) while Spain (0.90), Finland (0.93) and France (0.98) are 
very prone to earnings smoothing.  
In regard with GNP per capita Common law legal family stands significantly out as the GNP per 
capita in the United States is nearly $50,000. On the other hand French civil law countries ($35,474) 
have the lowest GNP per capita. At the country level Norway ($56,894), Switzerland ($46,215) and 
United States ($49,516) have the highest GNP per capita while the lowest are in Poland ($19,747) 
and Italy ($31,555). The results support the suitability of GNP per capita as the proxy for the 
development of stock markets.  
As expected investor protection measures receive the highest values in Common law and 
Scandinavian law legal families. The value of anti-director rights index that measures country’s 
stance towards minority shareholders is highest in Scandinavian law (3.63) countries and lowest in 
German civil law (2.50) countries. Similarly, anti-self-dealing index that measures country’s 
attitude towards expropriation of outside investors is highest in Common law legal family (0.65) 
and lowest in German civil law countries (0.27).  
5.1.2 Summary statistics for owner identity 
This section focuses on describing the sample statistics relative to the identity of the largest owner. 
Table 3 presents the prevalence of different owner identities across the world. The firms are 
classified according to two measures. First, I classify the firms according to their largest owner 
without taking into consideration the ownership share. In this case the different owner identities are 
institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and private equity. Second I classify 
the firms using an ownership threshold of 10%. All firms where the largest owner holds less than 10% 
of the shares are classified as widely held. The other owner identities are the same as in the first 
case.  
When measured at the 10% ownership threshold 32% of the firms in the sample are considered as 
widely held. The result is mainly driven by United States where 37.5% of firms are widely held.  
Ownership concentration is highest in French civil law countries where only 17% of the firms are 
classified as widely held. German civil law and Scandinavian law legal families stand in the middle 
with 24% and 23% of firms regarded as widely held.  
Following widely held firms family/individual (28%) and institutional investors (25%) are the next 
largest owner identity groups. The prevalence of institutional owners is especially high in United 
States (33%) while family/individual ownership is most common owner identity in both French 
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(51%) and German (43%) civil law countries. In the Scandinavian law countries institutional and 
family/individual owner identities are equally common.  
Table 3 - Identity of the Largest Owner (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country N Threshold Family Institutional Corporation Bank Government Private Equity Widely held
United States 1,934 - 26.47 63.81 6.36 0.21 - 3.15 -
10% 21.41 32.57 5.79 0.05 - 2.64 37.54
Common law 1,934 - 26.47 63.81 6.36 0.21 - 3.15 -
10% 21.41 32.57 5.79 0.05 - 2.64 37.54
Austria 16 - 31.25 25.00 25.00 6.25 6.25 6.25 -
10% 31.25 12.50 25.00 6.25 6.25 6.25 12.50
Germany 202 - 39.60 33.17 18.81 3.96 1.98 2.48 -
10% 34.65 7.43 16.83 1.98 1.98 2.48 34.65
Poland 107 - 41.12 23.36 32.71 - 1.87 0.93 -
10% 39.25 18.69 32.71 - 1.87 0.93 6.54
Swizerland 84 - 54.76 25.00 11.90 3.57 2.38 2.38 -
10% 50.00 9.52 10.71 2.38 2.38 1.19 23.81
German civil law 409 - 42.79 28.61 21.27 2.93 2.20 2.20 -
10% 38.88 11.00 20.05 1.71 2.20 1.96 24.21
Belgium 39 - 48.72 23.08 23.08 2.56 - 2.56 -
10% 43.59 10.26 20.51 2.56 - 2.56 20.51
France 191 - 53.40 18.85 22.51 - 1.57 3.66 -
10% 50.79 6.81 21.47 - 1.57 3.66 15.71
Italy 67 - 68.66 8.96 16.42 1.49 2.99 1.49 -
10% 68.66 2.99 16.42 1.49 2.99 2.99 4.48
Netherlands 53 - 22.64 58.49 7.55 7.55 - 3.77 -
10% 20.75 20.75 7.55 5.66 - 3.77 41.51
Spain 51 - 52.94 5.88 23.53 13.73 1.96 1.96 -
10% 43.14 1.96 23.53 13.73 1.96 1.96 13.73
French civil law 401 - 51.37 20.45 19.70 3.24 1.50 3.74 -
10% 48.13 7.73 18.95 2.99 1.50 3.24 17.46
Denmark 37 - 24.32 40.54 29.73 2.70 - 2.70 -
10% 21.62 21.62 27.03 2.70 - 2.70 24.32
Finland 61 - 26.23 37.70 24.59 - 8.20 3.28 -
10% 18.03 22.95 24.59 - 8.20 3.28 22.95
Norway 29 - 31.03 10.34 51.72 - - 6.90 -
10% 27.59 3.45 51.72 - - 3.45 13.79
Sweden 85 - 29.07 47.67 16.28 - 2.33 4.65 -
10% 26.74 25.58 16.28 - 1.16 3.49 26.74
Scandinavian law 212 - 27.70 38.50 25.82 0.47 3.29 4.23 -
10% 23.47 21.13 25.35 0.47 2.82 3.29 23.47
Total Sample 2,956 - 32.19 51.37 11.63 1.01 0.74 3.04 -
10% 27.60 25.40 10.96 0.71 0.71 2.67 31.96
N - 952 1,518 344 30 22 90 -
10% 816 751 324 21 21 79 945
This table presents the prevalence of different owner identities across countries and legal families. Two kinds of ownership classifications are used in the
analysis. First, I classify the firms according to the identity of their largest owner without taking into consideration the ownership share owner identities
being family/individual, insitutional, corporation, bank, government and private equity. Second, I classify the firms using ownership control treshold of 10%,
below which a firm is expected to be widely held. Percentages are provided per country, legal family and the sample as a whole.
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Among the legal families corporate ownership is most prevalent in Scandinavian law countries 
(25%) where Norway drives the results with 52% of the firms being owned by another corporation. 
Corporate ownership is also relatively common in French (19%) and German (20%) civil law 
countries. On the other hand, corporate ownership is very rare in United States where only 6% of 
the firms are owned by another corporation. 
Bank, government and private equity owners are considerably less universal than the above 
mentioned owner identities. Bank ownership is most common in French civil law countries where 3% 
of the sample firms are considered as bank owned. In both Scandinavian law and Common law 
countries only one firm is identified as bank owned. On the other hand government ownership is 
most prevalent in Scandinavian law countries (3%). Especially Finland stands out as 8% of the 
sample firms are classified as government owned. The prevalence of private equity ownership is 
almost identical across legal families ranging from 2 to 3 percent. The relatively low level of private 
equity ownership is due to the fact that private equity investors mainly own private companies. 
If the firms are classified only according to the largest owner, 51% of the firms are classified as 
institutionally owned. Again, the result is mainly driven by United States where 64% of the firms 
fall under the institutional owner category. Also in the Scandinavian law countries the largest owner 
is institutional investor in the majority (39%) of companies.  Contrary, family/individual ownership 
is most prevalent in French (51%) and German (43%) civil law countries. In line with the statistics 
for 10% ownership threshold bank, government and private equity ownership are far less common 
than the other owner identities.  
In addition to the differences in the prevalence of owner identities across countries, the level of 
ownership concentration varies significantly. Several previous studies (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; 
Del Brio et al., 2011) demonstrate the level of ownership concentration is significantly lower in 
United States than in most of German and French civil law countries. Further, the average 
ownership share of the largest shareholder differs notably between owner identities (e.g. Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2003; Blomqvist, 2008). Table 4 presents the mean and median ownership share of 
the largest owner by owner identity across countries and legal families.  
As it can be seen from the table there is considerable variation in the level of ownership 
concentration across both countries and owner identities. As expected the average ownership share 
of institutional investors (15.3%) is lowest. There is also very little variation in the ownership share 
of institutional investors across legal families. Shareholdings of institutional investors are more 
diversified and they presumably do not seek control in the firms in the same way as some other 
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owner identities do which might explain their rather limited ownership share. On the other hand 
ownership concentration is significantly higher in private equity owned firms where the average 
ownership share is 26%. This implies that unlike majority of institutional investors private equity 
investors have preference for control and they desire to influence the corporate decision making.  
Table 4 - Ownership Share of the Largest Owner by Owner Identity (%) 
 
Contrary to institutional ownership, family/individual, corporate and government ownership are all 
associated with high levels of ownership concentration. These owner identities seek to control the 
firms they own and affect corporate strategy. Corporations and families have especially high 
ownership shares in German and French civil law countries. Families hold on average 42% in 
French and 37% in German civil law countries of the company shares. For corporations the average 
ownership share is staggering 51% in both German and French civil law countries. However, the 
ownership shares of families and corporations are significantly lower in Common and Scandinavian 
law countries. In both Scandinavian and Common law countries the average ownership share of 
families is around 25% and corporate ownership share approximately 32%. The ownership share of 
governments is on average 31%, yet there is a lot of variation across the legal families. In German 
       Institutional             Family        Corporation        Government       Private Equity
Country N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
United States 1,934 12.05 10.11 24.28 19.67 32.23 24.90 9.13 8.76 - - 24.60 19.60
Common law 1,934 12.05 10.11 24.28 19.67 32.23 24.90 9.13 8.76 - - 24.60 19.60
Austria 16 38.28 31.69 48.28 64.00 40.83 36.70 15.00 15.00 31.50 31.50 65.00 65.00
Germany 202 8.66 5.21 36.52 31.90 52.56 54.79 13.58 12.23 35.27 27.85 32.16 18.25
Poland 107 22.43 17.68 36.49 31.91 53.56 58.67 - - 62.80 62.80 26.61
Swizerland 84 12.11 8.98 36.62 30.42 38.18 36.78 17.88 13.90 30.11 30.11 46.54 46.54
German Civil law 409 13.23 7.42 36.87 32.20 50.77 54.46 14.77 14.45 39.82 31.50 38.38 26.61
Belgium 39 21.40 9.91 39.40 45.43 45.33 50.12 16.50 16.50 - - 30.16 30.16
France 191 15.10 6.66 44.50 42.05 54.64 55.59 - - 23.93 26.57 24.81 22.76
Italy 67 29.36 29.96 49.02 53.80 50.91 53.29 62.37 62.37 23.73 23.73 16.55 13.28
Netherlands 53 9.65 8.23 21.03 20.82 45.93 46.45 11.55 12.70 - - 15.07 15.07
Spain 51 5.10 1.77 28.71 25.44 45.40 45.49 20.78 20.12 20.05 20.05 10.00 10.00
French civil law 401 14.06 8.17 41.60 41.60 51.22 50.75 20.81 18.11 23.21 23.31 21.23 17.87
Denmark 37 15.28 10.63 31.65 31.93 30.21 33.80 16.62 16.62 - - 28.60 28.60
Finland 61 17.32 12.30 17.78 13.36 30.13 28.49 - - 29.50 30.84 59.75 59.75
Norway 29 7.76 8.28 27.00 24.21 37.69 26.71 - - - - 12.62 12.62
Sweden 85 14.76 10.24 26.84 22.68 26.77 25.44 - - 20.97 20.97 24.03 21.78
Scandinavian law 212 15.32 10.66 25.14 22.05 31.35 28.36 16.62 16.62 27.06 30.84 22.42 22.02
Total Sample 2,956 12.43 9.97 30.40 25.01 41.14 38.33 16.70 15.16 31.23 29.71 25.90 19.75
Bank
This table demonstrates the mean and median ownership share of the largest owner by owner identity across countries and legal families. The classified
owner identities are institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and private equity. Ownership share of the largest owner is calculated as
the portion of the shares outstanding and does not take into account any means by which ownership differs from control.
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civil law countries governments own around 40% of the company shares while in French civil law 
countries the average ownership is only 23%. Bank ownership falls in the middle of institutional 
and other owner identities, the average ownership share being 17%.  
It can be concluded that ownership concentration is associated with certain owner identities and 
legal families. The average ownership share of the largest owner is biggest in German and French 
civil law countries and lowest in Common law countries, while Scandinavian law countries fall 
somewhere in the middle. In regard with owner identities, institutional investors own distinctly 
smallest shares across legal families while family, corporate, government and private equity 
ownership are associated with high ownership concentration.     
5.1.3 Summary statistics for owner identity and unrelated corporate diversification 
Table 5 presents unrelated corporate diversification by owner identity measured at the 10% 
ownership control threshold. From the table we can see that private equity (0.08) ownership is least 
associated with unrelated diversification. This supports the assumption that private equity firms 
seek to invest in specialized companies that are easy to develop and sell further. Also companies 
owned by other institutional investors have on average low unrelated diversification levels. 
However, there is a lot of variation across legal families. The level of unrelated diversification is 
very low in Common law countries (0.13) while in French (0.33) and German (0.30) civil law 
countries institutionally owned companies are more diversified than other companies. The reason 
for this might be that in the United States institutional owners are most often large investment 
management companies that are willing to take on more risk whilst in Europe institutional owners 
are more often insurance and pension companies that might have more risk averse investment 
policies as there are regulations that control their investment activity. 
Surprisingly, the level of unrelated diversification in family owned firms is almost the same as in 
institutionally owned firms. However, there is a lot of variation across legal families. The level of 
unrelated diversification in family firms is especially low in the United States (0.10) while in 
German civil law (0.30) countries it is significantly higher. As United States is overrepresented in 
the sample it pushes the average low for the whole sample. Furthermore, the unexpectedly low level 
of unrelated diversification in family owned firms is probably due to the fact that diversification 
tends to increase with firm size while the average firm size is smallest among family owned firms. 
However, the size-effect will be controlled for in the regression analysis discussed in the next 
section.  
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As expected, unrelated diversification is very high in government (0.41) and bank (0.25) owned 
companies. The level of unrelated diversification is consistently very high in government owned 
firms across legal families while there is a lot of variation in the diversification levels of bank 
owned firms.  However, measured at the 10% ownership only 21 government- and 21 bank-owned 
firms were identified. Thus, the rather small number of observations might influence the reliability 
of the statistics. 
Table 5 - Unrelated Corporate Diversification by Owner Identity 
 
The level of unrelated diversification in widely held firms is higher than in firms owned by families, 
corporations, institutional and private equity investors, but lower than in government and bank 
owned firms. According to several previous studies (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 1997) 
the presence of a large blockholder reduces the number of unrelated acquisitions which suggests 
that the level of unrelated diversification should be highest in widely held firms where there is no 
controlling owner that monitors managers. However, the previous studies do not take into account 
Institutional Family Corporation Bank Government Private Equity Widely held
Country N DIVER1 DIVER1 DIVER1 DIVER1 DIVER1 DIVER1 DIVER1
United States 1,934 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.57 - 0.06 0.19
Common law 1934 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.57 - 0.06 0.19
Austria 16 0.57 0.20 0.00 0.29 0.48 0.46 0.20
Germany 202 0.41 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.51 0.11 0.32
Poland 107 0.40 0.17 0.18 - 0.04 0.00 0.23
Swizerland 84 0.27 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.74 0.00 0.38
German Civil law 409 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.13 0.32
Belgium 39 0.29 0.27 0.08 0.00 - 0.00 0.20
France 191 0.35 0.24 0.19 - 0.53 0.09 0.34
Italy 67 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.62 0.27 0.11
Netherlands 53 0.35 0.25 0.00 0.00 - 0.14 0.39
Spain 51 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.00 0.26 0.02
French civil law 401 0.33 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.47 0.13 0.30
Denmark 37 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.00 - 0.00 0.32
Finland 61 0.20 0.19 0.11 - 0.27 0.31 0.27
Norway 29 0.00 0.26 0.21 - - 0.00 0.12
Sweden 85 0.21 0.21 0.04 - 0.42 0.00 0.16
Scandinavian law 212 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.22
Total Sample 2,956 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.41 0.08 0.21
This table presents unrelated diversification by owner identity. DIVER1 is the proxy for unrelated diversification and it is calculated using the
sales-based Entropy index. A higher value indicates a higher level of unrelated corporate diversification. The identity of the largest owner is
classified according to the 10% ownership treshold. N stands for the number of observations in the sample. 
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the identity of the controlling owner. As demonstrated earlier, the prevalence of controlling 
shareholders might bring forth other agency problems, namely the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholder. In the case of certain owner identities the conflict 
between blockholders and minority shareholders might be more severe than the manager–
shareholder conflict. Thus, it might it be that it is rather certain owner identities than the entrenched 
managers that drive value reducing corporate strategies. 
5.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
This section discusses the results obtained from the regression analyses. The first part analyses the 
relation between owner identity and unrelated corporate diversification. The second part looks into 
the association between investor protection and unrelated corporate diversification. Finally it is 
investigated whether the operating environment affects the association between owner identity and 
unrelated corporate diversification.  
5.2.1 Owner identity and unrelated corporate diversification 
In this section I analyze the relationship between owner identity and unrelated corporate 
diversification. I expect certain owner identities to drive unrelated corporate diversification more 
than others.  
I regress the unrelated corporate diversification proxy, DIVER1, against the identity of the largest 
owner, firm- and country level control variables and industry membership (measured according 2-
digit SIC-codes). The ownership threshold used is 10%. If the largest shareholder owns less than 
10%, the firm is classified as widely held. The results for the four different weighted ordinary least 
squares regressions are presented in table 6. Model 1 investigates the association between owner 
identity and unrelated corporate diversification. In addition to variables used in the first model, 
model 2 controls for investor protection proxied by anti-self-dealing index (ASD). Model 3 includes 
dummy variables for the different legal families, common law legal family being the reference 
group, while model 4 controls for the sample countries. 
The signs of the control variables are much as assumed in all of the regressions. Log assets and 
leverage have expected signs and are statistically significant through all models. Positive sign of log 
assets supports the assumption that unrelated diversification increases with firm size. On the other 
hand, negative sign of the leverage coefficient supports the theory on the potential of debt in 
reducing agency problems. Contrary, the sign of the proxy for capital intensity (Capex) is negative 
in all regressions against the expectations. Though, the variable is not statistically significant in any 
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of the regressions. GNP per capita, which measures the development of stock markets, is negative 
in the first and fourth model but positive in the second and third regression. The volatility through 
the models suggests that GNP variable might have problems with collinearity with anti-self-dealing 
index and legal family dummies. The same applies for country-level earnings smoothing variable 
which suddenly turns positive in model 3 which includes legal family dummies.  
Accordingly, owner identity coefficients are for most part in line with the expectations. Further, the 
behavior of the coefficient remains virtually identical through the models 1 to 4. Thus, the inclusion 
of investor protection measure, legal family dummies or country dummies does not seem to alter 
the influence of owner identity on unrelated corporate diversification. As hypothesized private 
equity owned firms engage less in unrelated corporate diversification than widely held firms. The 
coefficient is negative and remains statistically highly significant in all models. Of all owner 
identities private equity ownership is the least associated with unrelated corporate diversification. 
This supports the argument that private equity firms are vigilant monitors who step in the corporate 
decision making if they are not satisfied with the management (Andres et al., 2010). As private 
equity firms seek to increase the value of the companies they own and then sell them with profit, 
they are probably highly concerned with the shareholder value of the firms they control. Moreover, 
private equity funds manage investment portfolios which include companies from various sectors, 
and thus have no need for further diversification.  
Similarly, firms owned by institutional investors engage less in unrelated diversification than 
widely held firms, the coefficient being negative and statistically significant in all four regressions. 
The results are in line with the findings of Ramaswamy et al. (2002) who report that the proportion 
of institutional investor ownership is negatively associated with unrelated diversification. As the 
literature suggests that unrelated diversification reduces firm value the results provide further 
evidence on the argument that institutional investors’ main concern is increasing shareholder value.   
The coefficient for corporate ownership is negative as expected but statistically not significant in 
any of the four regressions. The t-statistics and coefficient of corporate ownership are very close to 
zero which supports the hypothesis that the effect of corporate ownership on the level of unrelated 
diversification is indifferent. However, the results are in regard with widely held firms. Compared 
with family, bank and government ownership, corporate ownership seems to be notably less 
associated with unrelated diversification. The natural explanation for this might be that the parent 
company diversifies through the subsidiary it owns, and thus has no need for the subsidiary to be 
diversified.   
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Table 6- Weighted Ordinary Least Squares Regression for the Largest Shareholder measured 
at 10% Ownership Threshold and Unrelated Corporate Diversification 
 
Independent variable Expected sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.2196** -0.4167*** -0.7982*** -0.4033***
(-2.07) (-4.23) (-6.24) (-5.02)
Family/Individual - 0.0040 0.0037 0.0038 0.0038
(0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Institutional - -0.0367** -0.0362** -0.0362** -0.0346**
(-2.44) (-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.41)
Corporation +/- -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0030
(-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.11)
Bank - 0.1170 0.1000 0.1017 0.1074
(1.22) (0.99) (1.01) (1.07)
Government - 0.0478 0.0382 0.0398 0.0376
(0.52) (0.43) (0.45) (0.42)
Private equity - -0.0857*** -0.0857*** -0.0855*** -0.0854***
(-3.03) (-3.03) (-3.02) (-3.01)
Log assets + 0.0347*** 0.0346*** 0.0346*** 0.0346***
(9.41) (9.37) (9.35) (9.33)
Leverage - -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004**
(-2.42) (-2.41) (-2.4) (-2.4)
Capex + -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21)
ROA - -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013
(-0.05) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.04)
GNP - -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000***
(-1.03) (1.56) (1.52) (-2.71)
Earnings smoothing (EScountry ) - -0.2899** -0.0173 0.1242
(-2.33) (-0.16) (1.02)
Anti-selg-dealing index (ASD) - -0.4003***
(-4.98)
German civil law dummy + 0.1858***
(5.19)
French civil law dummy + 0.1228***
(3.22)
Scandinavian law dummy + 0.029***
(2.81)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no no no yes
R-squared 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.166
N 2,956 2,956 2,956 2,956
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER1
The table presents the results for weighted ordinary least squares (WOLS) regressions for unrelated corporate
diversification, DIVER1, identity of the largest shareholder at 10% ownership treshold, firm- and country-level control
variables and two-digit SIC code dummies (1). Regression (2) controls also for investor protection measured by anti-self-
dealing index (ASD). Regression (3) includes legal family dummies, common law legal family being the reference group.
Finally, regression (4) controls for country dummies. Unrelated corporate diversification, DIVER1, measured by the sales-
based Entropy index is the dependent variable and calculated as of the end of 2010. Identity of the firm's largest
shareholder is the identity of the owner with the highest ownership share exceeding 10%. The ownership categories are
family/individual, institutional, corporation, bank, government and private equity. If the largest shareholder holds less than
10% of the share the firm is categorized as widely held. Firm-level control variables are natural logarithm of assets as of
year-end 2010, return on assets (ROA), capital expenditures to sales -ratio, and debt-to-equity -ratio, all measured as 3-
year (2008-2010) averages. Country level control variables are GNP per capita in $US for 2010 and country median of the
firm-level earnings smoothing variable.
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The coefficients of family/individual, bank and government owner identities are positive in all 
regressions. In line with the hypotheses these owner identities seem to be associated with unrelated 
corporate diversification more than institutional, private equity and corporate owners. On the other 
hand, the results imply that family/individual, bank and government owner identities engage in 
unrelated diversification more than widely held firms which contradicts with previous findings (e.g. 
Amihud and Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 1997) suggesting that the presence of a controlling shareholder 
reduces the level of corporate diversification. Nonetheless, the results are not statistically significant 
for any of the three owner identities. The insignificance of bank and government ownership 
coefficients might be due to the small number of observations in the sample as only 21 bank and 
government owned firms were identified. In particular, the coefficients and t-statics of family and 
government owner identities are close to zero which indicates that their diversification behavior 
does not technically differ from widely held firms. The coefficients of bank ownership are 
significantly larger and t-statistics just slightly insignificant. Thus, it seems that the association 
between unrelated corporate diversification and bank ownership is stronger than the one between 
family or government ownership and diversification. The results for bank ownership are in line with 
the findings of Ramaswamy et al. (2002) which demonstrate a positive relationship between bank 
ownership and the level of unrelated corporate diversification.  
Even though all of the owner identity coefficients are not statistically significant, the results provide 
interesting implications. Previous studies demonstrating a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and the level of corporate diversification have presumed homogeneity of the owners. 
However, this study differentiates between owner identities and demonstrates that owner identity is 
a significant moderator of the influence of ownership concentration on diversification strategy. The 
results suggest that different motivations, resources and capabilities associated with various owner 
identities affect the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate diversification. 
Private equity and institutional ownership reduce the level of unrelated diversification while in the 
case of family/individual, bank and government ownership it seems to be the controlling owner 
instead of the unmonitored managers who drive unrelated diversification. Further, family/individual, 
bank and government owner identities tend to hold large shares of the companies they own, so that 
they have the power to pursue their own agendas. Thus, the results indicate that in some cases 
unrelated corporate diversification is driven more by certain owner identities than entrenched 
managers. 
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5.2.2 Investor protection and unrelated corporate diversification 
In this part I regress the unrelated diversification proxy, DIVER1, on investor protection measures, 
firm- and country level control variables, 2-digit SIC industry dummies and legal family dummies 
(regressions 4-6). I assume the level of unrelated corporate diversification to be negatively 
associated with the level of investor protection. The investor protection measures used are anti-self-
dealing index (ASD) and anti-director-rights index (ADR). The results for the regression are 
presented in Table 7.  Model 1 regresses DIVER1 against both investor protection measures (ADR 
and ASD) and firm- and country level control variables. Model 2 includes only ASD while model 3 
contains just ADR. Regressions 4 to 6 are similar to models 1 to 3 except for the inclusion of legal 
family dummies. 
As in the first part, the coefficient of log assets is positive and statistically highly significant in all 
of the regressions. Accordingly, leverage is statistically significant at 5% level through the four 
models. The proxy for capital intensity, Capex, has expected sign in all of the regressions but is not 
statistically significant in any of them. Surprisingly, return on assets (ROA) is consistently positive, 
yet statistically insignificant, in all of the regressions.  
Country-level earnings smoothing variable is negative, as expected, in the first three regressions. 
The coefficient is also significant at 1% level in the second model that does not include anti-self-
dealing index. However, in the regressions that include legal family dummies the coefficient turns 
positive and statistically insignificant. The results might indicate collinearity between the earnings 
smoothing variable and both the ASD and the legal family dummies. On the other hand, GNP per 
capita is positive against expectations and statistically significant in all regressions except for the 
third regression where the coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. As with the earnings 
smoothing variable, the variation of GNP per capita might indicate collinearity problems with other 
explanatory variables.     
Anti-self-dealing index (ASD) that measures a country’s stance towards expropriation of outside 
investors by the corporate insiders (managers and large shareholders) is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level in models 1 and 3. Model 1 regresses unrelated diversification against both 
investor protection measures and control variables while model 3 includes only ASD. The results 
imply that in countries where the level of protection of outside investors against the self-dealing of 
corporate insiders is higher firms engage less in unrelated diversification. Efficient control over 
expropriation of outside investors makes it harder for both entrenched managers and large 
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shareholders to derive private benefits from diversification. This in turn might reduce the 
willingness of corporate insiders to engage in unrelated diversification.  
Table 7 - Weighted Ordinary Least Squares Regression for Investor Protection and the Level 
of Unrelated Corporate Diversification 
 
Independent variable Expected sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.3036*** -0.706 -0.3867*** -1.1315** -0.7970*** -1.1181***
(-3.09) (-0.63) (-4.34) (-2.52) (-6.05) (-2.84)
Anti director rights index (ADR) - -0.0314* -0.0411** 0.0023 -0.0027
(-1.78) (-2.24) (0.11) (-0.15)
Anti self-dealing index (ASD) - -0.4167*** -0.4265*** 0.3143 0.3058
(-5.31) (-5.34) (0.83) (0.88)
Log assets + 0.0340*** 0.0341*** 0.0339*** 0.0339*** 0.0034*** 0.0339***
(9.9) (9.94) (9.9) (9.88) (9.88) (9.88)
Leverage - -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004**
(-2.53) (-2.54) (-2.53) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.52)
Capex + 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ROA - 0.0035 0.0031 0.0039 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Earnings smoothing (EScountry ) - -0.0941 -0.3909*** -0.0586 0.2358 0.1001 0.2310
(-0.87) (-3.09) (-0.55) (1.05) (0.82) (1.11)
GNP - 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*
(2.07) (-0.13) (1.8) (1.68) (1.78) (1.78)
German civil law dummy + 0.3378** 0.1981*** 0.3336**
(1.95) (5.5) (0.035)
French civil law dummy + 0.2483* 0.1365*** 0.2461*
(1.7) (3.65) (1.77)
Scandinavian law dummy + 0.1794* 0.0891*** 0.1786
(1.6) (2.92) (1.63)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R
2
0.160 0.159 0.160 0.160 0.161 0.161
N 2,956 2,956 2,956 2,956 2,956 2,956
Number of countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER1
This table documents the weighted ordinary least squares (WOLS) regression results for unrelated corporate diversification
proxy,DIVER1, investor protection measures, firm- and country level control variables, 2-digit SIC industry dummies and legal family
dummies (regressions 4-6). DIVER1 is the sales-based Entropy index measured at the end of year 2010. Anti director-rights index
(ADR) and anti-self-dealing index (ASD) are measures of investor protection. Log assets proxies for firm size and is the nathural
logarithm of assets in 2010. Leverage demonstrates capital structure and is a 3-year (2008-2010) average of debt to equity -ratio.
Capex proxies for capital intensity and is a 3-year (2008-2010) average of capital expenditures to sales -ratio. ROA demonstrates
prior performance and is a 3-year (2008-2010) average of return on assets. EScountry is the country median of the earnings smoothing
variable calculated as the ratio of firm-level standard deviation of operating income and operating cash-flow, both scaled by assets.
Higher EScountry indicates less earnings smoothing in the country. GNP is the cross national product per capita in 2010 in $US and
demonstrates the level of stock market development in the country. German civil, French civil and Scandinavian law are dummy
variables for the legal origin of the country, Common law being the ommited reference category. 
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Accordingly, anti-director rights index (ADR) that measures minority shareholders’ rights in a 
country, is negative and statistically significant at 10% and 5% in models 1 and 2. Model 1 includes 
both investor protection measures while model 2 contains just ADR. The results suggest that also 
better protection of general shareholder rights reduces the level of unrelated corporate 
diversification. However, the coefficient of ADR is smaller and statistically less significant than the 
coefficient of ASD. Further, the predictive power of ADR reduces significantly when ASD is 
included into the model. This implies that ASD is superior over ADR in explaining unrelated 
corporate diversification. This in turn supports the argument that private benefits of diversification 
are one of the main drivers of corporate diversification (see e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003) as 
ASD focuses on the self-dealing by managers and large shareholders on the cost of outside 
investors. In self-dealing the unmonitored manager or controlling owner takes advantage of his 
position and acts for his own interest rather than for the interest of all shareholders. 
However, both ADR and ASD lose their predictive power when legal family dummies are included 
in the regression models. Further, ASD turns positive both in models 4 and 6 while ADR turns 
positive only in model 4 that includes also ASD. There are two probable reasons for the puzzling 
behavior of the investor protection variables. First, also La Porta et al. (1998) find the predicting 
power of ADR to be significantly smaller in a model that includes legal family dummies. They 
suggest that investor protection indices are of second-order importance relative to legal family 
dummies as country’s legal origin accounts for the differences in legal rules and regulations to a 
significant extent. Further, La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that in addition to legal rules there is 
something more in legal families that affects corporate decision making. The fact that legal family 
dummies are statistically significant and have notably higher coefficients than investor protection 
measures through models 4 to 6 supports these arguments. On the other hand, there might be 
collinearity between investor protection measures and the legal family dummies which could cause 
the inconsistent behavior of the investor protection measures. Further, it seems that collinearity 
between ASD and legal family dummies is more severe as the legal family coefficients are 
statistically most significant in the regression that includes only ADR.  
Based on the results, it can be concluded that the level of investor protection is associated with the 
level of unrelated corporate diversification. The higher ASD and ADR scores a country has the 
lower the level of unrelated corporate diversification on average is. However, it seems that the 
investor protection indices do not have predictive power over the legal origin of the country in 
explaining the diversification behavior. As La Porta et al. (1998) suggest it seems that there is 
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something else besides the legal rules and regulation to legal families that affect the diversification 
behavior in a country.  
5.2.3 Owner identity, investor protection and unrelated corporate diversification 
As demonstrated earlier the level of investor protection varies across countries and legal families. 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) discover that measured by ASD and ADR the level 
of investor protection is highest in Common law and lowest in French and German civil law 
countries. Further, it has been shown that the effect of owner identity and ownership structure on 
firm value depends on the level of investor protection in a country (see e.g. Ruis Mallorqui et al., 
2011; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2003). It can be thus assumed that owner identities behave 
differently depending on the institutional background. To test this, I perform the owner identity 
regressions for Common law legal family and continental European sub-sample, which includes 
German and French civil law countries, separately.  
As in the previous part a 10% control threshold for ownership is used. For comparison I run also a 
regression with no control threshold for ownership. The results for Common law environment are 
presented in table 8. The regression results for Common law context are very similar to the results 
for the whole sample. The control variables behave mostly as expected. In line with the main 
regressions log assets and leverage are the only statistically significant control variables. Measured 
at 10% ownership threshold the coefficients of private equity and institutional investors are 
negative and significant at the 5% level. Family and corporate ownership variables are positive, but 
statistically not significant. If examined without ownership threshold and using institutional 
investors as a reference group family ownership is positive and significant at 10% level. Private 
equity ownership remains negative and statistically significant while corporate ownership is 
positive, but statistically insignificant. Thus, family firms seem to engage significantly more in 
unrelated diversification while private equity firms notably less than institutionally owned firms in 
Common law environment.  
The results for continental European sample are presented in table 9. Of the control variables 
leverage and log assets behave as expected and are statistically significant at 1% level. Interestingly, 
the coefficient of leverage is slightly bigger and statistically clearly more significant than in the 
regressions conducted in Common law environment. This might indicate that in continental Europe 
leverage is a more powerful tool in mitigating agency problems than in Common law countries. On 
the other hand, diversified continental European companies might not be able to fully exploit the 
capacity of diversified firms to bear on more debt. Also capital expenditures to sales ratio (Capex)  
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Table 8 - Ordinary Least Squares Regression for the Owner Identity and Unrelated 
Corporate Diversification in Common Law Environment 
 
is statistically significant at 5% level in the continental European context. However, the negative 
sign of the coefficient is somewhat surprising as the theory suggests that firms with higher capital 
expenditures to sales ratios would be more willing to pursue diversification.    
Independent variable Expected sign 10% threshold No threshold
Intercept -0.5472*** -0.6022***
(-8.64) (-9.41)
Family/Individual - 0.0032 0.0301*
(0.18) (1.92)
Institutional - -0.0376** 0
(-2.51)
Corporation -/+ 0.0020 0.0131
(0.07) (0.5)
Bank - - -
Government - - -
Private equity - -0.0846** -0.0725**
(-2.15) (-2.04)
Log assets + 0.0346*** 0.0366***
(10.11) (10.63)
Leverage - -0.0004* -0.0005*
(-1.87) (-1.91)
Capex + -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.03) (-0.06)
ROA - -0.0002 -0.0077
(-0.05) (-0.21)
SIC dummies yes yes
R-squared 0.165 0.164
N 1,934 1,934
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER1
The table presents the results for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for unrelated corporate diversification,
DIVER1, identity of the largest shareholder, firm-level control variables and two-digit SIC code dummies in Common
law context. Unrelated corporate diversification, DIVER1, measured by the sales-based Entropy index is the
dependent variable and calculated as end of 2010. In regression 1 a 10% ownership threshold is used. The
ownership categories are institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and private equity. If the
largest shareholder holds less than 10% of the shares the firm is categorized as widely held. In regression 2
companies are categorized solely according to the largest owner and institutional investor is used as the reference
category. Firm-level control variables are natural logarithm of assets as of year-end 2010, return on assets (ROA),
capital expenditures to sales -ratio, and debt-to-equity -ratio are all measured as 3-year (2008-2010) averages.
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The owner identities behave quite differently in the continental European environment than in the 
Common law context. Surprisingly, institutional investors seem to be most associated with 
unrelated corporate diversification when measured at the 10% ownership threshold. The 
coefficients of all owner identities except for institutional ownership are negative. However, the 
coefficient of institutional investor ownership is not statistically significant. The radical change in 
the behavior of institutional ownership might be explained by the differences within institutional 
investor ownership group. In the United Stated most of the institutional investors are large asset 
management firms that invest the funds of retail investors. Contrary, in continental European 
countries large insurance and pension companies are more prevalent. The investment strategies of 
insurance and pension companies are often regulated which might make them more risk averse than 
independent asset management companies. On the other hand, similar to banks, insurance and 
pension companies are often involved in business relationship with the companies they invest in. 
The fear of losing an important customer might make them reluctant to actively control and monitor 
the management. In line with this, Ramaswamy et al. (2002) find evidence that insurance company 
ownership is positively related with the level of unrelated diversification in India.       
Similar to Common law context private equity coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level. Contrary, corporate ownership is negative and for the first time statistically significant at 
10% level. This indicates that corporate ownership is less associated with unrelated diversification 
in continental European countries than in Common law countries. The coefficients of 
family/individual, government and bank ownership are negative, but none of them are statistically 
significant.   
In the second regression companies are categorized solely according to the largest owner and 
institutional ownership is used as a reference category. All owner identity coefficients are negative 
which supports the assumption that in continental European context institutional investors engage 
most in unrelated diversification. Family, corporate and private equity ownerships are statistically 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The coefficients of the owner identity variables 
are slightly higher in the regression with no ownership threshold which suggests that owner identity 
might have more influence in corporate decision making than ownership share in continental 
European context. 
Overall, the coefficients and t-statistics of owner identities are somewhat higher in continental 
European context than in Common law environment. This supports the assumption that ownership 
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Table 9 - Weighted Ordinary Least Squares Regression for the Owner Identity and Unrelated 
Corporate Diversification in Continental European Environment 
 
structure plays more important role in countries characterized by weak investor protection (e.g. 
Thomsen and Pedersen, 2003; Blomqvist, 2008). It is worthwhile to notice that it is not only the 
magnitude but also the direction of the effect of owner identity on corporate diversification that 
differs between Common law and continental European environment. In Common law context only 
private equity and institutional investor ownership are less associated with unrelated corporate 
Independent variable Expected sign 10% threshold No threshold
Intercept -0.5312*** -0.5003***
(-3.31) (-3.11)
Family/Individual - -0.0439 -0.0635*
(-1.17) (-1.76)
Institutional - 0.0190 0
(0.31)
Corporation -/+ -0.0704* -0.0859**
(-1.72) (-2.15)
Bank - -0.0273 -0.0605
(-0.45) (-0.76)
Government - -0.1079 -0.0433
(-0.22) (-0.34)
Private equity - -0.1913*** -0.1980***
(-3.5) (-3.83)
Log assets + 0.0366*** 0.0361***
(4.88) (4.74)
Leverage - -0.0045*** -0.0042**
(-2.61) (-2.43)
Capex + -0.0249** -0.0259**
(-2.16) (-2.12)
ROA - 0.0592 0.0583
(0.49) (0.48)
SIC dummies yes yes
R
2
0.201 0.202
N 810 810
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
The table presents the results for weighted ordinary least squares (WOLS) regression for unrelated corporate
diversification, DIVER1, identity of the largest shareholder, firm- level control variables and two-digit SIC code
dummies in continental European context. Unrelated corporate diversification, DIVER1, measured by the sales-
based Entropy index is the dependent variable and calculated as end of 2010. In regression 1 a 10% ownership
treshold is used. The ownership categories are institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and
private equity. If the largest shareholder holds less than 10% of the shares the firm is categorized as widely held. In
regression 2 companies are categorized solely according to the largest owner and institutional ownership is used as
the reference category. Firm-level control variables are natural logarithm of assets as of year-end 2010, return on
assets (ROA), capital expenditures to sales -ratio, and debt-to-equity -ratio areall measured as 3-year (2008-2010)
averages.
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER1
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diversification than widely held firms. Contrary, in continental Europe institutional investor is the 
only owner identity that seems to engage more in unrelated diversification than widely held firms. 
The results indicate that the agency problems between unmonitored managers and outside 
shareholders are more severe in continental European environment. It might be that weaker investor 
protection increases the availability of private benefits and in the absence of controlling 
shareholders managers extract these benefits. Overall, it seems that institutional background 
significantly affects the influence that owner identity has on corporate decision making. 
6 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section I run additional regressions to test the robustness of the results obtained in the main 
analysis. First, I run the owner identity regression in ordinary least squares (OLS) framework. 
Second, I conduct owner identity regression using different control thresholds for ownership.  
6.1 OWNER IDENTITY AND UNRELATED DIVERSFICATION IN ORDINARY LEAST 
SQUARES FRAMEWORK 
 As a first robustness test I run the owner identity models in the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
framework. In the main analysis I use the weighted ordinary least squares method where each 
observation is weighted by the inverse of the number of companies from that country. The 
advantage of OLS relative to WOLS is that it reduces the bias related to countries with only few 
observations where individual companies might have too great influence on the results. On the 
other hand OLS overemphasizes large countries that are highly represented in the sample. In this 
case, the results might reflect the situation in United States rather than describing the worldwide 
situation. The results for the OLS regressions are presented in table 10.  
For the most part the results are similar to the results obtained in the WOLS regressions. The 
behavior of the control variables follows the same pattern as in the main regressions expect that 
leverage is not statistically significant anymore. As the predictive power of leverage is somewhat 
weaker in the United States and OLS overemphasizes the observations from United States the effect 
of leverage deteriorates. Contrary, the coefficient and t-statistics of log assets are higher in OLS 
regressions. This result is also likely driven by United States where the association between firm 
size and the level of unrelated diversification is high. 
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Table 10 - Ordinary Least Squares Regression for the Identity of the Largest Owner at 10% 
threshold and Unrelated Corporate Diversification 
 
 
Independent variable Expected sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.3426*** -0.3701*** -0.7333*** -0.3873***
(-4.42) (-4.81) (-7.06) (-5.36)
Family/Individual - 0.0058 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0012
(0.38) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.07)
Institutional - -0.0333** -0.0271* -0.0264* -0.0268*
(-2.29) (-1.87) (-1.83) (-1.85)
Corporation +/- -0.0271 -0.0359* -0.0362* -0.0342*
(-1.35) (-1.8) (-1.81) (-1.7)
Bank - -0.0181 -0.0558 -0.0487 -0.0358
(-0.27) (-0.85) (-0.74) (-0.53)
Government - 0.0297 0.0150 0.0133 0.0154
(0.44) (0.23) (0.2) (0.23)
Private Equity - -0.0951*** -0.0981*** -0.0966*** -0.0950***
(-2.73) (-2.83) (-2.79) (-2.74)
Log assets + 0.0372*** 0.0348*** 0.0351*** 0.0352***
(12.7) (11.91) (11.87) (11.82)
Leverage - -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-1.15) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.13)
Capex + -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.06)
ROA - -0.0108 0.0022 -0.003 -0.0018
(-0.3) (0.06) (-0.09) (-0.05)
GNP - -0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000** -0.0000***
(-2.65) (1.82) (2.08) (-3.52)
Earnings smoothing (EScountry ) - -0.0991 -0.0703 0.0261
(-1.16) (-0.83) (0.27)
Anti-selg-dealing index (ASD) - -0.3967***
(-6.69)
German civil law dummy + 0.1915***
(7.17)
French civil law dummy + 0.1181***
(3.99)
Scandinavian law dummy + 0.0894***
(3.47)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no no no yes
R-squared 0.157 0.17 0.173 0.18
N 2,956 2,956 2,956 2,956
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
The table presents the results for ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for unrelated corporate diversification, DIVER1, identity of the
largest shareholder at 10% ownership treshold, firm- and country-level control variables and two-digit SIC code dummies (1). Regression
(2) controls also for investor protection measured by anti-self-dealing index (ASD). Regression (3) includes legal family dummies,
common law legal family being the reference group. Finally, regression (4) controls for country dummies. Unrelated corporate
diversification, DIVER1, measured by the sales-based Entropy index is the dependent variable and calculated as of the end of 2010.
Identity of the firm's largest shareholder at 10% ownership threshold is the identity of the owner with the highest ownership share
exceeding 10%. The ownership categories are institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and private equity. If the
largest shareholder holds less than 10% of the share the firm is categorized as widely held. Firm-level control variables are natural
logarithm of assets as of year-end 2010, return on assets (ROA), capital expenditures to sales -ratio, and debt-to-equity -ratio, all
measured as 3-year (2008-2010) averages. Country level control variables are GNP per capita for 2010 and country median of the firm-
level earnings smoothing variable.
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER1
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The behavior of owner identities is quite similar than in the WOLS regressions. Private equity and 
institutional ownership coefficients are again negative and statistically significant throughout the 
models. In line with the main analysis, family/individual and government ownership coefficients 
are positive, yet statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient and t-statistics of corporate 
ownership are higher in OLS framework than in WOLS regressions. The coefficient of corporate 
ownership even becomes statistically significant in models 1-3 in OLS framework. This might 
reflect the less emphasis put on small outlier countries in OLS framework; unrelated diversification 
is very high in corporate owned firms in Denmark and Switzerland that have very few observations.   
In addition, the coefficient of bank ownership receives a negative sign contrary to the positive sign 
in WOLS regressions. However, the results for bank ownership are not statistically significant. 
Overall, it seems that the results are congruent with the main analysis. Only the behavior of 
corporate ownership seems to be significantly different in OLS framework. 
6.2 OWNER IDENTITY AT DIFFERENT CONTROL THRESHOLDS 
In the main analysis I use a 10% control threshold for ownership. As a robustness check I will 
perform the same regressions using a 20% ownership threshold and no ownership threshold at all. 
Besides the 10% ownership threshold the 20% ownership threshold has been widely used in 
ownership studies. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether there is a great difference between the 
results obtained by using 10% and 20% ownership threshold. The reason for classifying the firms 
only according to their largest owner is to investigate if owner identity has more predictive power 
over ownership share in corporate decision making.  
The results of the two regressions are documented in table 11. As the behavior of the variables is 
basically identical through models 1 to 4, I present only the results for the model 1 which does not 
include ASD, legal family dummies or country dummies. Surprisingly, the results for the 20% 
ownership threshold differ quite a lot from the results for 10% threshold in regard with owner 
identities. When measured at the 20% ownership threshold institutional investor coefficient is 
positive, which indicates that institutionally owned firms engage more in unrelated diversification 
than widely held firms. The results might reflect the small number of observations from Common 
law environment as very few institutional owners in the United States control over 20% share of the 
companies they invest in. The number of institutional investors seven-folds in Common law legal 
family while the number only two- or three-folds in other legal families when the threshold is 
lowered to 10%. On the other hand asset management firms, which in particular have been shown 
to be associated with low levels of unrelated diversification, rarely own over 20% share of the firms  
61 
 
Table 11 - Weighted Ordinary Least Squares Regression for the Identity of the Largest 
Owner and Unrelated Corporate Diversification 
 
they invest in. It might be that institutional investors who own over 20% of the shares are mostly 
either hedge funds or insurance/pension companies. Accordingly, Ramaswamy et al. (2002) 
Independent variable Expected sign 20% threshold No threshold
Intercept -0.1786* -0.2037*
(-1.72) (-1.91)
Family/Individual - 0.0302* 0.0281**
(1.85) (2.04)
Institutional - 0.0088 0
(0.35)
Corporation +/- 0.0136 0.0095
(0.48) (0.41)
Bank - 0.1257 0.1273
(0.59) (1.15)
Government - 0.0572 0.0482
(0.59) (0.57)
Private Equity - -0.0788** -0.0780***
(-2.08) (-3.17)
Log assets + 0.0369*** 0.0378***
(10.98) (10.87)
Financial leverage - -0.0002** -0.0002**
(-2.54) (-2.52)
Capex + 0.0000 0.0000
(0.31) (0.32)
ROA - -0.0136 -0.0155
(-0.52) (-0.59)
GNP - -0.000 -0.000
(-0.33) (-0.55)
Earnings smoothing (EScountry) - -0.4301*** -0.4061***
(-3.42) (-3.17)
SIC dummies yes yes
R-squared 0.142 0.144
N 2,956 2,956
*Significant at 10 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level
The table presents the results for weighted ordinary least squares (WOLS) regressions for unrelated corporate
diversification, DIVER1, identity of the largest shareholder, firm- and country-level control variables and two-digit
SIC code dummies. Unrelated corporate diversification, DIVER1, measured by the sales-based Entropy index is the
dependent variable and calculated as of the end of 2010. In the first regression the identity of the firm's largest
shareholder is the identity of the owner with the highest ownership share exceeding 20%. The ownership categories
are institutional, family/individual, corporation, bank, government and private equity. If the largest shareholder holds
less than 20% of the share the firm is categorized as widely held. In the second regression the firms are classified
according to the largest owner without giving any thought to the ownership share and insitutional investors is the
ommited ownership cateogry. Firm-level control variables are natural logarithm of assets as of year-end 2010, return
on assets (ROA), capital expenditures to sales -ratio, and debt-to-equity -ratio are all measured as 3-year (2008-
2010) averages. Country level control variables are GNP per capita for 2010 and country median of the firm-level
earnings smoothing variable.
Dependent variable: Unrelated corporate diversification proxy DIVER 1
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demonstrate that insurance company ownership is positively related with the level of unrelated 
diversification in India. Hedge funds, on the other hand, might seek to own diversified companies 
that they plan to break down into pieces and divest later on.  
The positive association between family ownership and unrelated corporate diversification seems to 
be robust across different ownership thresholds. However, the relation is strongest and statistically 
most significant at the 20% ownership threshold. This indicates that higher ownership share enables 
families to better influence corporate decision making and push through their own agendas. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of private equity ownership is again negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The smaller coefficient and weaker statistical significance are probably due to the 
reduced number of observations relative to the case with 10% ownership threshold. Corporate, 
government and bank ownership yield again statistically insignificant results even though the signs 
are similar to the results obtained with 10% control threshold.  
The results for the regressions where no ownership threshold is used are similar to the main model. 
As expected, family ownership is more associated with unrelated corporate diversification than 
institutional investors and the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. Also bank, 
government and corporate ownership indicate higher level of unrelated corporate diversification 
even though the results are not statistically significant. Private equity ownership suggests again 
lower level of unrelated diversification and is statistically significant at 1% level. Overall, the 
results seem to be equally robust with the regressions where ownership threshold is used. This 
supports the assumption that there are differences between owner identities and owner identity 
clearly affects the level of unrelated diversification. It might be even that in some cases owner 
identity plays a bigger role in the corporate decision making than the ownership share. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Most of the previous papers investigating the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate diversification neglect the importance of owner identities and treat owners as a 
homogenous group. Thus, the objective of this paper was to demonstrate how the differences in the 
motivations, monitoring capabilities and control structures of different owner identities affect the 
corporate diversification decision. In addition, the aim was to provide further evidence on the 
association between unrelated corporate diversification and investor protection and demonstrate that 
the effect of owner identity on corporate decision making is dependent on the institutional 
environment where the company operates. 
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The research was based on analyzing a sample consisting of 2,956 firms from 14 countries and four 
different institutional environments - Common law, German civil law, French civil law and 
Scandinavian law. In the regression analysis unrelated corporate diversification, calculated using 
the sales-based Entropy index, was used as dependent variable. Investor protection was measured 
by the legal origin of the country and two investor protection indices: anti-self-dealing index (ASD) 
and anti-director rights index (ADR). To capture the effect of different owner identities, companies 
were categorized into family/individually, institutionally, corporate, bank, government and private 
equity owned companies. All companies where the largest shareholder holds less than 10% of the 
shares were classified as widely held.   
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
The results show that the owner identity is an important factor in corporate decision making (see 
summary of the results in table 12). In line with hypothesis, I find significant differences in how 
owner identities behave in respect to corporate diversification decisions. Of all owner identities, 
unrelated corporate diversification is least common among private equity owners. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for private equity is statistically highly significant and robust through different models 
and ownership thresholds. I also observe a negative relationship between institutionally owned 
firms and unrelated corporate diversification, especially in Common law environment which further 
supports  previous findings of for example (Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Hautz et al. 2011).   
The results for other owner identities - family/individual, bank and government- are not statistically 
significant, but offer interesting implications. In line with hypothesis these owner identities seem to 
be associated with unrelated corporate diversification more than institutional, private equity and 
corporate owners. However, contradicting the previous findings (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Denis 
et al., 1997) - which argue that the presence of controlling shareholder reduces the level of 
corporate diversification – I find that family/individual, bank and government owned firms appear 
to engage in unrelated diversification more than widely held firms. The positive signs of family, 
bank and government ownership coefficients imply that the presence of a controlling shareholder 
reduces the level of unrelated diversification only in the case of certain owner identities whereas 
some owner identities seem to drive unrelated diversification more than unmonitored managers.  
With regards to the impact of investor protection on the prevalence of unrelated corporate 
diversification, my results are in line with previous findings (see e.g. Fauver et al., 2003; Del Brio 
et al, 2011). I find that unrelated corporate diversification is most common in German and French 
civil law countries, which are characterized by weak shareholder protection, and least prevalent in 
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Common law environment known for high level of investor protection. In line with this, investor 
protection measures ASD and ADR are negatively associated with the level of unrelated corporate 
diversification. Of the two measures ASD seems to better explain unrelated corporate 
diversification. This supports the agency cost explanation that corporate diversification is mainly 
driven by private benefits of diversification (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003) as ASD focuses on the 
self-dealing by corporate insiders. However, it seems that neither ASD nor ADR has predictive 
power over the legal origin of a country as they turn statistically insignificant in regressions that 
include legal family dummies. This supports the argument made by La Porta et al. (1998) that there 
is something more to legal families, other than the legal rules and regulations that affects corporate 
decision making.  
Finally, I tested the hypothesis concerning the role of institutional background in determining the 
effect of owner identity on corporate diversification decision by running the owner identity 
regressions in Common law and continental European environment (French and German civil law 
countries). As expected, the results indicate significant differences in the behavior of owner 
identities between the two sub-samples. Overall, the coefficients and t-statistics of owner identity 
variables are somewhat larger in the continental European sub-sample than in the Common law 
regressions. This is line with previous studies (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen, 2003; Blomqvist, 2008) 
suggesting that owner identity plays a bigger role in countries characterized with weak shareholder 
protection.  
However, not only the magnitude of the effect but also the direction of the effect differs between 
Common law and continental European samples. In Common law environment institutional 
investors engage significantly less in corporate diversification than widely held firms while in 
continental Europe, institutional investors is the only ownership category that is associated with 
unrelated diversification more than widely held firms. One possible explanation for the surprising 
discovery is the differences within the institutional owner identity category between the sub-
samples. In the United States majority of the institutional investors are large asset management 
firms while in continental Europe insurance and pension companies are more prevalent. In their 
study Ramaswamy et al. (2002) demonstrate a negative association between unrelated 
diversification and mutual fund/asset management firm ownership whereas their results indicate a 
positive relationship between insurance company ownership and unrelated diversification. In 
addition, the results suggest that agency problems between managers and outside shareholders are 
more severe in continental European environment. Contrary to Common law context, all owner 
identities except for institutional investors are associated less with unrelated diversification than 
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widely held firms in continental European countries. This provides further support on the theory 
that ownership concentration acts as a substitute for legal investor protection in countries 
characterized by weak shareholder protection. 
Table 12 - Summary of Key Findings 
 
7.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Even though the study reveals intriguing and novel findings on the link between owner identity and 
corporate decision making, it brings up several pitfalls that should be reconsidered in the future 
Hypothesis Description of the hypothesis Whole sample Different institutional environments
H1 Family ownership is associated with
higher level of unrelated corporate
diversification 
Moderate support. Positive and significant
relationship when compared to institutional
investors. Significant positive association at the
10% treshold, but insignificant at the 20%
threshold when compared to widely held firms. 
Mixed support. Positive and statistically
significant association in Common law
environment. Contrary, negative and
statistically significant relationship in German
and French civil law countries. 
H2 Institutional ownership is associated with
lower level of unrelated corporate
diversification   
Strong support. Negative and statistically
significant effect on unrelated diversfication,
even after controlling for investor protection,
legal families and countries.
Mixed Support. Negative and statistically
significant association in Common law
environment. Positive, yet statistically
insignificant relationship in continental
European countries. 
H3 Bank ownership is associated with higher
level of unrelated corporate diversification
Weak support. Consistently positive, but
insiginificant throughout models and different
ownerhip tresholds. The low statistical
significance might be a result of a small sample
size.
Mixed support. A negative, but statistically
insignifacant relationship in continental
European countries contrary to the results for
whole sample.
H4 Corporate ownership is not related with
the level of unrelated diversification 
Strong support. Negative and statistically
insginificant association at 20% while positive
association at 10% threshold compared to
widely held firms. Negative and insignificant
association compared to institutional investors. 
Mixed support. Negative and statistically
significant effect on unrelated corporate
diversfication in French and German civil law
countries. Contrary, positive but insignificant
effect in Common law environment.
H5 Government ownership is associated with
higher level of unrelated corporate
diversification  
Weak support. Consistently positive, but
insiginificant throughout models and different
ownerhip tresholds. As with bank ownership,
low statistical significance might be a result of a
small sample size.
Mixed support. Contrary to the results for
whole sample, negative yet insignificant
association with unrelated diversifcation in
continental European countries.
H6 Private equity ownership is associated
with significantly lower level of unrelated
corporate diversification
Strong support. Highly statistically significant
negative association with unrelated
diversfication through different models and
ownerhip thresholds.
Strong support. Negative and highly significant 
effect on unrelated diversfication both in
Common law and continental European
countries. 
H7 Higher level of investor protection is
associated with lower level of unrelated
corporate diversification
H8 The impact of owner identity on the level
of unrelated corporate diversification is
higher in countries where investor
protection is weak
H9 The impact of owner identity on the level
of unrelated corporate diversification is
weaker in countries where investor
protection is good
Key findings
Strong/Moderate support. Both investor protection measures, anti-self-dealing index (ASD) and
anti-director rights index (ADR), has negative and significant effect on the level of unrelated
diversfication when model does not include legal family dummies. However, both measures loose
their prediction power when legal family dummies are included. 
Moderate suppport. Measured at the 10% threshold corporate ownership has significant and
private equity ownership highly significant effect on unrelated diversfication in continental Europe.
Using no threshold at all family, corporate and private equity ownership have significant influence
on unrelated corporate diversfication. Further, owner identity coefficients are larger than in the
regressions conducted in Common law environment.  
Moderate support. At the 10% threshold both institutional and private equity ownership have
significant effect on diverwsfication decisions. If no threshold is used, family/individual coefficient
is barely significant and private equity coefficient significant. Thus, owner identity seems to matter
also in Common law envrionmnet. However, the effect is notably weaker.
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research. As mentioned in the section 1.3. the main limitations of the study relates to the definition 
of ownership structure and unrelated corporate diversification. Therefore, the main focus in the 
future research should be in identifying more effective measures of ownership structure and 
corporate diversification. 
First, alternative methods for approximating the ownership structure should be considered. The 
identity of the largest owner is a widely used proxy in the literature even though it is a quite rough 
estimator of the ownership structure. First, it disregards possible additional ownership of the largest 
owner through other mediums. Second, it does not account for the power of largest owner relative 
to the next largest owners. It would be worthwhile to examine the five or ten largest owners of the 
company and construct a framework that would better capture different dimensions of the 
ownership structure. Further, using the control rights instead of the cash-flow rights of the owners 
might generate more reliable results as applying the shareholding of the largest owner might not in 
some cases capture the true influence that the owner has on corporate decision making.       
Second, it would be worthwhile to use even more fine grained division of the owner identities as 
there seems to be differences in the objectives and monitoring capabilities within the defined owner 
categories. Especially institutional ownership includes very heterogeneous owner identities. 
Therefore, institutional investor category could be further divided into asset management 
firms/mutual funds, insurance/pension companies and hedge funds. Accordingly, private equity 
investors could be divided into venture capitalists, private equity funds and business angels as 
Bruton et al. (2010) demonstrate significant differences in the objectives and behavior of the 
different private equity investors. Overall, a more fine grained division of owner identities would 
help to better identify the specific characteristics that drive unrelated corporate diversification.  
Third, there has been a lot of criticism towards SIC-codes that are used to calculate unrelated 
diversification indices. As the specificity of SIC-codes in dividing business segments into unrelated 
and related has been questioned another method to perform the industry classification should be 
considered. One possible option could be using the Fama-French industry classification where the 
business segments classified according to SIC-codes are grouped under redefined industry 
portfolios. Using the redefined industry portfolio classification might enable more accurate division 
of operations into related and unrelated business segments.  
Fourth, this study is effectively a cross-section of the fiscal year end in 2010. It would fruitful to 
examine the effect of different owner identities on unrelated corporate diversification over time. 
Certain owner identities seek to actively affect corporate decision making and develop the company 
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into a desired direction. Thus, it would be interesting to follow how the effect evolves over time and 
how possible changes in ownership share or owner identity affect corporate decision making.   
Finally, the study demonstrates that there are significant differences in the effect of owner identity 
on unrelated corporate diversification between Common law and continental European countries. It 
would be interesting to further investigate which factors cause the differences in the influence of 
owner identity on corporate diversification between different institutional environments. It should 
be examined whether it is the owner identity groups that differ across countries or if there is 
something more to legal families besides the laws and regulations, as La Porta et al. (1998) suggest, 
that affects the diversification behavior. In addition, it would be intriguing to expand the sample to 
include countries from Asia, Africa and Southern America. Currently, the study covers only 
developed countries located either in Europe or United States. Including developing economies 
would bring more depth into the analysis of the role of legal families in corporate diversification 
decisions as the results for developed and developing economies belonging to the same legal family 
could be compared. 
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